The	Origins	of	Phenomenology	in	Austro-German	Philosophy: Brentano	and	Husserl GUILLAUME	FRÉCHETTE This	is	the	pre-peer	reviewed	version	of	the	following	article: [Fréchette, Guillaume, „The Origins of Phenomenology in Austro-German	Philosophy.	Brentano,	Husserl, J.	Shand	(ed), A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Philosophy, WileyBlackwell, 2019, pp. 418-453],	which	has	been	published in final	form	at	https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119210054.ch16. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance	with	Wiley	Terms	and	Conditions	for	Use	of	SelfArchived	Versions. In	J.	A.	Shand	(ed.),	Blackwell	Companion	to	19th-Century	Philosophy,	London,	WileyBlackwell,	2019,	pp.	418-453. §1.	Historical	Background.	Brentano	and	19th-century	European	philosophy §1.1.	Aristotle's	heir §1.2.	Brentano	and	his	school §1.3.	Husserl §2.	Some	General	Principles	of	Brentano's	Philosophy §2.1. Principle	(a):	Philosophy	as	a	science §2.2. Principle	(b):	Anti-Kantianism §2.3. Principle	(c):	Empiricism §2.4. Principle	(d):	The	mereological	nature	of	substance §2.5. Principle	(e):	The	correctness	principle §3.	The	Phenomenology	of	Brentano	and	Husserl §3.1.	Phenomenology,	Phenomena,	and	Experiences §3.2.	Description	and	its	tools i) exactness ii) examples iii) eidetic	variations §3.3.	Intentionality i) the	basic	theory	of	intentionality ii) the	enhanced	theory iii) the	reistic	version iv) Husserl's	account	of	intentionality §3.4.	Consciousness §3.5.	Emotions	and	values §3.6.	Psychologism	and	anti-psychologism 1. Historical	Background.	Brentano	and	19th-Century	European	Philosophy The	development	of	phenomenology	in	19th-century	German	philosophy	is	that	of	a particular	stream	within	the	larger	historical-philosophical	complex	of	Austro-German 2 philosophy.	It	finds	its	origins	even	before	Hegel's	death	in	1831,	in	the	teachings	and works	of	Bernard	Bolzano,	and	develops	into	a	structured	whole	through	the	works	of Franz	Brentano	and	his	school.	This	main	current	in	its	development	includes	other parallel	Austrian	influences	from	Johann	Friedrich	Herbart,	Richard	Avenarius,	Ludwig Boltzmann,	Ernst	Mach,	Ludwig	Wittgenstein,	and	the	members	of	the	Vienna	Circle;	and contributions	from	its	natural	allies	in	German	philosophy,	especially	Friedrich Trendelenburg,	Rudolph	Hermann	Lotze,	and	Gottlob	Frege.	It	has	had	further ramifications	in	economics,	notably	in	the	works	of	Carl	Menger	and	Ludwig	von	Mises, in	literature,	in	the	works	of	Franz	Kafka	and	Robert	Musil,	and	in	many	other	fields.1 Brentano	is	the	backbone	of	Austro-German	philosophy	for	many	reasons.	He came	to	Austria	in	1874,	which	he	considered	to	be	a	favorable	context	to	found	a philosophical	school;2	he	was	instrumental	in	reintroducing	Bolzano,	the	grandfather	of Austro-German	philosophy,	to	Austrian	philosophers;	he	trained	or	contributed	to	the training	of	many	generations	of	Austro-German	philosophers,	ranging	from	Carl	Stumpf and	Anton	Marty	to	Alexius	Meinong,	Thomas	Masaryk,	Christian	von	Ehrenfels,	Alois Höfler,	Edmund	Husserl,	Kazimierz	Twardowski,	Oskar	Kraus	and	Schmuel	Hugo Bergman;	and	he	was	an	acknowledged	influence	on	many	philosophers	ranging	from Stout,	Moore,	and	Heidegger	to	the	Vienna	Circle	(the	authors	of	the	Manifesto)	and many	other	late	20thand	early	21st-century	philosophers,	on	both	sides	of	the	analytic vs.	continental	divide.	As	the	"grandfather	of	phenomenology"3	resp.	the	"disgusted grandfather	of	phenomenology,"4	but	also	as	the	key	figure	on	the	"Anglo-Austrian Analytic	Axis"	(Simons	1986;	Dummett	1988:7),	Brentano	is	at	the	source	of	the	two main	philosophical	traditions	in	20th-century	philosophy.	In	this	article,	I	will	focus mainly	on	his	place	in	19th-century	European	philosophy	and	on	the	central	themes	and concepts	in	his	philosophy	that	were	determinant	in	the	development	of	the	philosophy of	his	most	gifted	student:	Edmund	Husserl. 1 Cf. other similar definitions of Austrian and Austro-German philosophy in Haller (1979), Simons (2000), Smith (1981, 1989, 1994, 1996), and Mulligan (1989, 1990, 1997, 2001, 2012). 2 On his philosophical appreciation of Austria, see for instance his inaugural lecture "On the Causes of Discouragement in the Philosophical Domain", in Brentano (1929, pp. 85ff). See also his recollections in his letter to Bergman from 1909, published in Bergman (1946, p. 125). On his project to found a school as such, see Brentano (1895, p. 34), Husserl (1919/1976, pp. 156ff/48ff), and Fisette and Fréchette (2007, pp. 14ff) for further sources. 3 See Baumgartner (2003). 4 Ryle (1976). 3 Aristotle's	Heir Brentano's	interest	in	philosophy	was	doubtless	largely	conditioned	by	the	great philosophical	and	literary	talents	in	his	family,	and	its	role	in	the	development	of German	Romanticism.	His	uncle	Clemens	Brentano	and	his	aunt	Bettina	von	Arnim marked	the	history	of	German	Romanticism,	and	are	among	the	direct	successors	of Goethe	and	the	Weimarer	Klassik.	His	father,	Christian	Brentano,	was	well	known	as	a Catholic	writer.	He	took	a	great	interest	in	philosophy,	and	was	instrumental	in publishing	the	Nachlass	of	his	brother	Clemens.	He	supposedly	attended	Schelling's	first lectures	in	Jena,	which	left	him	with	a	terrible	impression.5 The	young	Franz	started	his	studies	in	Munich	in	1856,	under	the	supervision	of Ernst	von	Lasaulx,	who	was	also	a	friend	of	his	uncle	and	on	whom	he	had	previously made	a	very	good	impression.6	He	spent	two	years	in	Munich,	after	which	he	went	to Berlin	to	study	Aristotle	under	the	supervision	of	Trendelenburg.	Later,	Brentano	would write	that	he	did	not	always	consider	Trendelenburg's	method	of	closely	studying	text appropriate,	and	that	it	was	in	fact	Aquinas	who	was	his	foremost	guide	to	Aristotelian philosophy.7	In	Münster,	he	spent	an	academic	year	working	under	the	supervision	of Franz	Jakob	Clemens	and	Christoph	Bernhard	Schlüter,	who	not	only	trained	him	in medieval	philosophy,	but	also	introduced	him	to	Neo-Scholasticism.8 5 See his biography in Christian Brentano (1854, XIV). 6 From Lasaulx's correspondence as quoted in Stöltzle (1904, p. 231): "Franz is in fact a subtle man, whom I like very much" ("Franz ist in der Tat ein feinsinniger Mensch, der mir sehr wohl gefällt.") 7 See his letter to Hugo Bergman of January 22, 1908, published in Bergman (1946, p. 106). "I am far from denying that he [Trendelenburg] was once my master. It was indeed he who guided me to Aristotle. And as I was attending his lectures on Aristotle, I compared in the library the commentaries of the great schoolman [Aquinas] and found there some passages favorably explained, which Trendelenburg was not able to make comprehensible." See also Brentano's letter to the Prussian Academy of Sciences in 1914: "With Trendelenburg, I shared all my life the conviction that philosophy is capable of a truly scientific approach, but that it is incompatible with such an approach when, without any reverence toward the ideas transmitted by the great thinkers of earlier times, it aims to insert them anew in every head. Therefore, I followed his example when I dedicated some years of my life to the study of the works of Aristotle, which he taught me to consider as an unexploited treasure trove. The same conviction that there are no prospects for true success in philosophy when one does not proceed as in other scientific disciplines brought me to the conviction not to embrace everything at the outset, but rather to concentrate my whole energy on a few relatively simple tasks, as did Archimedes, Galilei, and according to his own report, Newton, who allegedly compared his work with that of a child fishing out a few shells from the sea. Here, not only does the old saying that the half is greater than the whole obtain, as it seems to me: even for a minuscule part, one can say that it is better to tackle it than wanting to embrace the whole for then, in reality, one embraces nothing." Letter quoted in Oberkofler (1989:IXf.) Husserl famously adapted Brentano's motto using a monetary metaphor: "Not always the big bills, gentlemen: small change, small change!" quoted in Gadamer (1987, p. 107). 8 Brentano's third habilitation thesis (see Brentano 1866/1929, p. 137) was partly inspired by Clemens, who published a well-known book (Clemens 1856) on philosophy as a servant to theology. For some time, Brentano first planned to write his dissertation on Suarez under the supervision of Clemens, who was famous for his scholarship on Suarez. First drafts of this dissertation are deposited in Brentano's Nachlass at the Houghton Library of Harvard University. 4 From	1860	to	1862,	Brentano	spent	most	of	his	time	working	on	his	PhD dissertation	on	the	various	meanings	of	being	in	Aristotle	(Brentano	1862).	Shortly	after his	doctorate,	he	entered	the	Dominican	convent	in	Graz	as	a	novice,	but	left	only	a	few months	later.	He	took	holy	orders	in	the	Catholic	seminary	in	Würzburg	in	August	1864. Brentano's	dissertation	made	a	good	impression	on	Trendelenburg,	who suggested	to	Ernst	Mach	in	1865	that	he	be	appointed	to	a	chair	in	philosophy	in	Graz.9 The	same	year,	Brentano	submitted	his	Psychology	of	Aristotle	(published	later	as Brentano	1867/1977)	as	habilitation	thesis	in	Würzburg.10	The	25	theses	defended	in his	habilitation	examination	in	1866	(Brentano	1866)	attest	to	the	continuity	of Brentano's	philosophical	programme.	He	defended	most	of	them	later	in	his	career.	In this,	he	followed	his	masters	Trendelenburg,	Clemens,	and	Lasaulx	in	their	critical stance	toward	Kant	and	Hegel	and	their	interest	in	a	scientific	philosophy,	along	with influences	from	French	positivism,	empiricism,	Aristotle,	and	Aquinas. The	set	of	particular	positions	taken	by	Trendelenburg,	Clemens,	and	Lasaulx	is complex,	but	a	quick	look	at	their	basic	philosophical	views	shows	that	they	complement each	other	in	a	way	which	Brentano	was	obviously	aware	of,	with	a	decisive	impact	on his	philosophical	education.	The	renewal	of	Catholic	philosophy	proposed	by	the	NeoScholastic	stream	propounded	by	Clemens	was	directed,	among	other	targets,	against Günther's	Hegel-inspired	speculative	theology.11	Analogously,	Trendelenburg's	efforts	to return	to	Aristotle's	theory	of	categories	was	also	directed	against	Kant's	deduction	of the	categories	and	the	kind	of	systematic	philosophy	that	emerged	from	it	via	Hegel	and Schelling.	On	another	level,	Lasaulx's	Kulturpessimismus	and	his	theory	of	the	history	of philosophy	as	a	Verfallsgeschichte	was	also	directed	against	the	so-called	modern	and progressive	tendencies	represented	by	the	bourgeois	philosophies	of	Kant	and	Hegel.	In this	respect	Brentano's	philosophy	of	history	(even	in	its	earliest	form:	see	Brentano 1867a)	shares	many	similarities	with	Lasaulx's	Philosophie	der	Geschichte	(1856),	which defends	a	historical	positivism	close	to	Comte's	view	of	the	three	stages	of	history	–	an approach	that	was	influential	in	the	conservative	German	circles	to	which	Brentano's family,	including	Brentano	himself,	belonged.12 9 On this, see the correspondence between Mach and Trendelenburg published in Thiele (1978, p. 205). 10 On these dates, see Stumpf (1922, p. 29). 11 On Clemens as the main German representative of Neo-Scholasticism, see Stöckl (1870, p. 836). 12 On Lasaulx's cyclical Verfallsgeschichte, see Schnabel (1937, p. 168) and in particular Schoeps (1953, pp. 62ff.). 5 Brentano	started	lecturing	in	Würzburg	as	a	Privatdozent	in	philosophy	in	1866. His	first	lectures	dealt	with	the	history	of	philosophy,	followed	soon	after	by metaphysics.	His	early	Würzburg	lectures	were	attended	by	Carl	Stumpf,	Anton	Marty, Carl	van	Endert,	Ernst	Commer,	Ludwig	Schütz,	and	Hermann	Schell.13	Not	only	did Brentano	have	a	strong	philosophical	influence	on	them	at	the	time,	he	was	also	their main	reference	in	religious	affairs. The	school	of	Brentano	might	have	developed	quite	differently	if	Brentano	had not	been	commissioned	in	1869	by	the	Bishop	of	Mainz,	Ketteler,	to	draught	a memorandum	on	papal	infallibility	in	preparation	for	the	first	Vatican	Council,	which started	in	December	of	that	year.	In	this	document	(Brentano	1969),	Brentano	relies mainly	on	philosophical	arguments	to	argue	against	papal	infallibility.	The	work	on	this memorandum	was	the	beginning	of	his	crisis	of	faith,14	and	led	him	to	the	conclusion that	all	dogmas	are	based	on	real	and	insoluble	contradictions.15 Even	before	writing	this	memorandum,	however,	Brentano	was	already	very optimistic	about	the	possibility	of	a	theistic	version	of	positivism	in	the	philosophy	of the	sciences,	which	would	be	supported	by	an	Aristotelian	metaphysics.	His	discussions of	the	works	of	Helmholtz,	Mill,	Comte,	and	Whewell	in	his	1867/68	lectures	on metaphysics	already	show	that	he	was	well	acquainted	with	positivism	at	the	time.	The connection	between	his	views	on	the	natural	sciences,	metaphysics,	and	theology became	clear	in	a	lecture	he	gave	in	Würzburg	in	1869	(and	in	1879	in	Vienna),	where he	argued	that	the	second	law	of	thermodynamics	formulated	by	Clausius	and	Thomson (Lord	Kelvin)	offers	a	support	for	the	cosmological	proof	for	the	existence	of	God,	as Thomson	(1855)	and	Clausius	(1865)	had	argued	before	him.16 With	the	proclamation	of	the	papal	infallibility	in	July	1870,	Brentano progressively	abandoned	his	Catholic	convictions,	but	maintained	his	position	as	a	priest (and	his	position	as	professor	of	philosophy	at	Würzburg)	until	April	1873.	His	official defection	came	only	a	few	weeks	before	he	became	involved	in	discussions	for	the appointment	of	a	replacement	for	the	chair	of	Franz	Lott	in	Vienna,	which	he	obtained with	the	support	of	Lotze. 13 See Stumpf (1919/1976, p. 103/19). 14 See Fels (1926/27), Utitz (1954, p. 77), Hertling (1919, pp. 208ff), Freudenberger (1969, pp. 148ff), Fisette and Fréchette (2007, pp. 25ff) 15 See Stumpf (1922, p. 71). 16 See Brentano (2016). 6 As	his	position	in	Würzburg	became	increasingly	uncomfortable	after	his	"inner break"	with	the	Church,	in	the	spring	of	1872	he	took	a	sabbatical	term,	traveling	to England	where	he	met	with	other	opponents	of	infallibilism	–	most	notably	William Robertson	Smith,	Cardinal	Newman,	Herbert	Spencer,	and	George	Jackson	Mivart.	He returned	to	Würzburg	in	the	late	summer	of	1872,	and	gave	his	last	semester	of	lectures there	in	1872/73. The	1872/73	lectures	on	psychology	bear	the	influence	of	British	empiricism, which	Brentano	studied	intensively	during	his	stay	in	London.	They	were	also	the	basis on	which	he	started	work	on	his	Psychology	from	an	Empirical	Standpoint,	particularly during	the	summer	and	fall	of	1873.	His	Psychology	was	conceived	as	a	six-volume project,	which	would	cover	investigations	on	1)	Psychology	as	a	science;	2)	Psychical phenomena	in	general;	3)	Presentations;	4)	Judgements;	5)	Acts	of	love	and	hate;	and	6) The	immortality	of	the	soul.	Ultimately	only	the	first	volume	and	the	first	part	of	the second	were	published,	in	Brentano	(1874).	Brentano	continued	with	work	on	the	third volume	in	spring	1875,	but	abandoned	the	project	shortly	thereafter.17 Brentano	and	his	School Brentano	came	to	Vienna	with	the	project	of	founding	a	school	and	encouraging Austrian	youth	to	enter	philosophy,18	and	found	immediate	success.	The	most prominent	among	his	first	Vienna	students	were	Tomás	Masaryk	(who	would	later	be instrumental	in	introducing	Husserl	to	Brentano),	Sigmund	Freud,	Alexius	Meinong, Alois	Höfler,	Benno	Kerry,	Alfred	Berger,	and	Christian	von	Ehrenfels. However,	Brentano's	academic	career	in	Vienna	took	an	unexpected	turn	in	1880, when	he	decided	to	marry	Ida	Lieben.	At	the	time,	as	a	former	priest	he	was	not	eligible to	marry	under	Austrian	law.	He	thus	repudiated	the	Austrian	citizenship	that	he	had acquired	through	his	appointment,	which	also	forced	him	to	resign	from	his	chair;	he acquired	Saxon	citizenship	and	married	in	Leipzig	in	September	1880.	He	then continued	to	lecture	in	Vienna	as	a	Privatdozent.	Although	the	ministry	promised	to reinstate	him	in	his	chair	on	multiple	occasions,	this	never	happened.	This,	along	with other	difficulties	with	the	authorities,	as	well	as	the	death	of	his	wife,	led	Brentano	to 17 Even before the first book was published on Easter 1874, Brentano wrote to Lotze about his doubts on the project. Years later, in a diary entry from 1904, he detailed the motives of his decision not to continue the project on the basis of his view that psychology was not yet ready at that time for such comprehensive works. See Falckenberg (1901, p. 112) Fréchette (2012, pp. 104ff), and Rollinger (2012, p. 301). 18 See Bergmann (1946, p. 306). 7 leave	Vienna	in	1895.	He	made	the	decision	public	and	explained	it	in	detail	in	a	public lecture	in	1894,	and	the	story	soon	came	to	be	known	in	Vienna	as	the	Affaire Brentano.19 His	later	teaching	in	Vienna	was	particularly	fruitful.	Among	his	most	important students	from	the	post-1870	Vienna	period,	we	find	Franz	Hillebrand,	Emil	Arleth, Kazimierz	Twardowski,	Hans	Schmidkunz,	Josef	Clemens	Kreibig,	and	Edmund	Husserl. Brentano's	last	years,	between	1895	and	1917,	were	spent	mostly	between Schönbühel,	his	summer	residence	on	the	Danube,	and	Florence,	where	he	elected domicile.	His	former	students	visited	him	regularly	in	both	places,	and	sent	their	own students	to	study	Brentano's	philosophy	with	the	master	himself.	Marty's	students	were particularly	receptive	to	this	offer:	Hugo	Bergman,	Alfred	Kastil,	Oskar	Kraus,	Emil	Utitz, and	Josef	Eisenmeier	all	came	from	Prague	and	visited	Brentano	regularly,	assisting	him in	dictations	and	readings,	which	became	necessary	after	1903,	when	he	underwent	an eye	operation	that	left	him	almost	completely	blind.	In	particular,	Oskar	Kraus	and Alfred	Kastil	played	an	important	role	in	publishing	some	of	Brentano's	lectures	in	the 1920s	and	1930s. Husserl Not	only	did	Brentano	fulfill	his	desire	to	found	a	philosophical	school,	but	he	also transmitted	this	desire	to	many	of	his	students.	This	was	the	case	of	Meinong	(Graz), Marty	(Prague),	Stumpf	(Berlin),	Twardowski	(Lemberg),	Hillebrand	(Innsbruck),	and	of course	Husserl	(Göttingen/Freiburg).	His	phenomenology	influenced	several generations,	starting	from	the	Munich	and	Göttingen	phenomenologists	and	extending to	the	later	generation	of	Freiburg	phenomenologists	after	1919.	But	first	a	few	more remarks	on	Husserl	in	this	specific	context. Two	years	after	Brentano	was	appointed	in	Vienna,	he	sent	one	of	his	first doctoral	students,	Tomáš	Masaryk,	to	spend	some	time	in	Leipzig	studying	psychology under	the	supervision	of	Wundt.20	It	was	on	this	occasion	that	Masaryk	met	a	fellow Moravian,	the	young	Edmund	Husserl,	who	attended	Wundt's	lectures	as	a	first-year undergraduate.	Masaryk	suggested	to	Husserl	that	he	go	to	Vienna	to	study	under 19 See for example Anonymous (1894, 1894a, 1895). 20 This was also the case of Twardowski: see Twardowski (1991/1999). 8 Brentano,	but	the	young	Husserl	was	in	Leipzig	to	study	under	Weierstrass.	He	later continued	his	studies	in	mathematics	in	Vienna,	completing	his	doctorate	in	1883. Husserl	was	heading	for	a	career	in	mathematics,	and	accepted	a	position	as assistant	to	Weierstrass	in	Berlin,	where	he	spent	a	semester.	In	autumn	1883	he enrolled	in	military	service,	during	which	his	interest	in	philosophy	grew	considerably After	having	spent	the	last	part	of	his	military	service	in	Vienna,	he	decided	to	begin attending	Brentano's	lectures	after	completing	his	service. Husserl	spent	two	years	in	Vienna	attending	all	of	Brentano's	lectures	and seminars:	on	practical	philosophy,	elementary	logic,	Hume's	Essay	on	Human Understanding,	psychology	and	aesthetics,	and	The	Limits	of	our	Knowledge	of	Nature	by Du	Bois-Reymond	(1872/1874).21	Husserl	left	a	positive	impression	on	Brentano,	who invited	him	to	spend	his	summer	holidays	with	him	on	Lake	Wolfgang	near	Salzburg, and	even,	together	with	his	wife	Ida,	painted	a	portrait	of	him.22	Since	Brentano	himself, acting	at	this	time	only	as	a	Privatdozent	in	Vienna,	was	not	in	a	position	to	habilitate Husserl,	he	suggested	that	he	go	either	to	Prague,	to	habilitate	under	Marty,	or	to	Halle, to	habilitate	under	Stumpf.23	Husserl	left	for	Halle,	and	a	year	later	obtained	his Habilitation	with	a	thesis	on	the	concept	of	number.	The	work	was	expanded	a	few	years later	into	the	Philosophy	of	Arithmetics	(1891/2003),	Husserl's	contribution	to	a Brentanian	philosophy	of	mathematics,	which	he	dedicated	to	Brentano. Husserl	spent	14	years	in	Halle	as	a	Privatdozent.	The	publication	of	his	magnum opus,	the	Logical	Investigations,	in	1900-01,	was	a	turning	point	both	in	his	career	and his	philosophical	development.	The	good	reception	that	the	work	received	from	Dilthey, the	Neo-Kantians,	and	the	Göttingen	mathematicians	facilitated	his	appointment	in Göttingen.	Philosophically,	Husserl's	views	evolved	considerably	between	his	Philosophy of	Arithmetics	and	the	Logical	Investigations.	Many	different	factors	contributed	to	this evolution,	including	among	others	his	correspondence	with	Frege	and	his	studies	of	the philosophical	works	of	Bolzano	in	the	mid-1890s.	These	led	him	to	his	critique	of psychologism	in	the	Logical	Investigations,	whose	epigraph	was	Goethe's	proverbial remark	that	"one	is	against	nothing	more	stridently	than	the	errors	one	has	first	set 21 See Husserl (1919, p. 155/1976, p. 48). 22 According to Spiegelberg (1981, pp. 119-122) the painting was destroyed in the bombing of Antwerp in 1940. 23 On April 8, 1886, Brentano wrote to Marty: "Dr. Husserl and Hillebrand are thinking about going to Prague this summer. Unfortunately, I could not tell them what you plan to lecture on." On October 22, 1886, he wrote again to Marty: "Husserl has now left for Halle. I recommended him to Stumpf with the reserves that seemed appropriate: I want to see what Stumpf thinks of him." 9 aside."	We	will	return	later	(section	3)	to	the	critique	of	psychologism,	which	played	a central	role	in	the	development	of	phenomenology. 2. Some	General	Principles	of	Brentano's	Philosophy Insofar	as	phenomenology	is	originally	a	specific	branch	of	Austro-German	philosophy, Brentano	and	Husserl	should	be	taken	equally	as	its	founders.	Like	Christianity, phenomenology	underwent	schisms	that	divided	the	original	territory	into	different subterritories.	One	of	the	first	schisms	occurred	after	Husserl's	sudden	discovery	of	his Ego	in	1913.24	This	discovery	slowly	brought	Husserl	onto	the	path	of	Southwestern Neo-Kantianism,	a	philosophy	that	is	directly	opposed	to	the	original	thrust	of phenomenology.	From	the	perspective	of	Brentano's	students,	his	philosophical	heirs, and	their	contemporaries,	another	important	schism	became	manifest	with	the publication	of	Heidegger's	Being	and	Time	in	1927	and	his	1929	inaugural	lecture	What is	Metaphysics?25 However,	since	this	article	is	concerned	with	the	origins	of	phenomenology,	we will	only	deal	here	with	themes	and	concepts	which	are	central	to	phenomenology	as	a branch	of	Austro-German	philosophy:	i.e.,	those	which	were	in	place	before	the	various schisms	described	above.	The	focus	is	on	these	themes	and	concepts	as	they	relate directly	to	the	basic	principles	of	Brentano's	philosophy,	or	their	determinant	role	in	the development	of	further	Austro-German	streams	that	originated	in	phenomenology: Gestalt	psychology,	the	theory	of	objects,	Munich-Göttingen	phenomenology,	and	many other	movements	in	20th-century	philosophy. As	mentioned	earlier,	Brentano's	25	habilitation	theses	from	1866	document	his programme	in	philosophy.	This	set	of	25	propositions,	characterizing	the	correct methodology	for	philosophy,	the	connection	between	language	and	thought,	drawing	the line	between	good	and	bad	philosophy,	and	stating	the	core	principles	of	ethics	and metaphysics,	present	some	of	the	most	fundamental	and	durable	ideas	in	Brentano's philosophy.	Following	the	inner	structure	of	these	propositions,26	it	is	reasonable	to 24 Husserl announced the discovery in a rather discreet manner, as a footnote in the second edition of the Logical Investigations (Husserl 2001, p. 353). On Husserl's discovery of the self, see Fréchette (2013a). 25 On the reactions of the Brentanians, see for instance Kraus (1931, p. 140) and Stumpf (1930). Carnap (1931, pp. 230-1) and Ryle (1931, pp. 230-1), who were otherwise both sympathetic to some aspects of early phenomenology, also noticed the change of perspective. 26 Contrary to the work that it prefigures, there has been little study of the inner structure of Brentano (1866). Kraus categorized the themes of the theses: methodology, ontology and metaphysics, continuity, psychology, 10 isolate	five	general	principles	among	them,	which	can	serve	here	as	a	guide	to Brentano's	conception	of	philosophy: five	general	principles	form	Brentano's	philosophy a) Philosophy	is	a	science:	philosophy	should	be	practiced	as	a	science	in the	unitary	sense	of	the	term,	which	excludes	a	distinction	between speculative	and	exact	sciences,	and	which	means	using	the	same methods	as	the	natural	sciences	(see	theses	1	and	4); b) Anti-Kantianism:	Kantianism,	including	its	views	on	the	proofs	of	the existence	of	God,	is	false	(see	theses	1,	6,	7); c) Empiricism:	philosophy	starts	from	experience	(see	theses	12,	13,	14, 15); d) The	mereological	nature	of	substance:	the	accident	contains	its substance;	there	are	ultimate	specific	determinations	of	the	substance, but	since	we	do	not	have	an	intuition	of	an	individual	substance	in	all its	determinations	–	we	only	have	intuitions	of	an	individual	substance through	the	accidents	given	in	intuitive	perception	–	we	cannot properly	know	it27	(see	theses	16,	17). e) Correctness	principle:	something	has	value	just	when	it	is	correct	to	love it;	a	judgment	is	true	just	when	it	is	correct	to	acknowledge (anerkennen)	the	existence	of	its	object	(see	theses	24,	25).28 Further	principles	of	Brentano's	philosophy,	which	are	formulated	in	the	25	habilitation theses,	also	played	an	important	role	in	his	intellectual	development,	although	for various	reasons	they	do	not	share	the	privileged	position	of	the	five	basic	principles	in his	system: philosophy of language, freedom of the will, ethics, and aesthetics (Brentano 1929, p. 165). Detailed discussions of some of the theses can be found in Gilson (1955), Ingarden (1969), and Sauer (2000). 27 The idea behind theses 16 and 17 is that the accident contains the substance and, analogously, that our concepts (e.g., the concept of redness) contain in themselves the intuition of something red. Like accidents, concepts are one-sidedly detachable from the intuition at their base (resp. from substance). See the quote in Chrudzimski (2004, p. 142). Thesis 16 is about the logical parts of a whole, which stand in a line of predication and which constitute, as a whole, the individual of a kind. Thesis 17 is about the metaphysical parts of a whole: every metaphysical part is different. 28 Cf. also Brentano (1889/1902, p. 17/15f). 11 f) Metaphysical	continuism:	space	is	a	finite,	non-empty	continuum	(theses 8,	9,	10); g) Linguistic	empiricism:	language	was	developed	as	an	auxiliary	tool	for thought	(theses	18,	19). This	is	a	corollary	of	principle	(c). h) Logical	reductionism:	Some	judgments,	like	disjunctive	judgments,	are simply	linguistic	formulations	of	other,	more	fundamental,	forms	of judgments	(theses	20,	21); i) Indeterminism	is	not	a	challenge	to	free	will	(thesis	23);29 j) Philosophy	should	not	be	considered	a	servant	to	theology,	although theology	might	sometimes	serve	as	a	guiding	star30	(theses	2	and	3). Among	the	various	reasons	why	principles	(f)	to	(j)	do	not	count	as	basic	principles,	it may	be	helpful	to	stress	a	few	in	particular:	changes	in	Brentano's	views	at	different stages	of	his	development	(e.g.,	principle	i);	insights	that	would	be	substantially developed	only	later	(e.g.,	principle	h);	the	limited	application	of	certain	insights	to	a specific	domain	of	philosophy	(principles	f	and	g);	and	having	metaphilosophical significance	chiefly	outside	philosophy,	and	therefore	not	being	directly	relevant	as	a philosophical	principle	(principle	j). Some	of	these	five	general	principles	are	deliberately	formulated	here	so	as	to	be interpretable	in	more	than	one	way,	for	two	reasons.	First,	there	is	no	documentation, besides	cryptic	marginal	notes	by	Brentano	himself,	on	how	he	actually	defended	the theses	during	his	disputatio.	Second,	and	consequently,	Brentano's	later	philosophy must	be	used	to	substantiate	the	principles.	Since	he	changed	his	mind	more	than	once on	many	philosophical	matters,	the	five	general	principles	are	illustrated	differently depending	on	the	particular	view	discussed. Principle	(a):	Philosophy	as	a	science 29 This position differs from Brentano's later compatibilist position on free will, from the 1870s onwards, for instance in Grundlage der Ethik, where he rejects indeterminism and argues for a compatibilist account. Kraus argues in Brentano (1929, p. 180) that the early Brentano was an indeterminist, but besides principle (i) and a small remark by Stumpf (1919, p. 106/1976, p. 21) there is no clear evidence that he has been an indeterminist in his early years. 30 On the guiding star (stellae rectrices), see Werle (1989, p. 134) and Sauer (2000, p. 128). On the guidance of theology, see particularly Brentano's teacher Clemens (1859, p. 15ff), on the "guidance of theology." The rejection of papal infallibility expressed in 1869 (reproduced in Freudenberger 1969) seems to articulate a clean break with this idea behind principle (j). For an alternative reading of the connection of principle (j) to the core principle (a), see Brandl (forthcoming). 12 According	to	principle	(a),	philosophy	must	oppose	the	distinction	between	exact	and speculative	sciences,	since	this	opposition	is	its	condition	of	existence	(thesis	1)	and	the methods	of	philosophy	are	none	other	than	the	methods	of	the	natural	sciences	(thesis 4).	The	first	thesis	was	directed	among	other	things	against	speculative	idealistic projects	like	that	of	Schelling;31	but	it	was	equally	directed	against	a	restricted understanding	of	the	"exact"	sciences	as	consisting	only	of	studies	involving	quantitative measurements.32	Brentano's	ideal	of	philosophy	as	a	science	combines	the	idea	that there	is	a	sense	of "speculation"	according	to	which	metaphysics	is	a	speculative,	and yet	exact,	enterprise	–	even	more	so	than	"exact	physics"	(in	a	sense	i	akin	to	Comte's positive	method	a	positive	speculation)33	–	with	the	idea	that	true	science	must	also allow	for	this	kind	of	"speculative	exactness,"	and	not	only	for	the	kind	of	exactness required	by	quantitative	measurements. Given	this	reading	of	thesis	1,	it	is	easier	to	understand	the	sense	in	which Brentano	considers	that	philosophy	be	understood	as	a	science,	and	his	claim	that	it shares	its	methods	with	natural	sciences.	Like	the	natural	sciences,	philosophy	uses methods	such	as	observation,	deduction,	and	induction,	insofar	as	they	are	applicable	to the	objects	of	their	investigation.	However,	this	does	not	mean	that	all	philosophical investigations	should	be	conducted	with	the	methods	of	the	natural	sciences,	which would	amount	to	naturalism.	Rather,	as	suggested	in	thesis	1,	there	is	a	sense	in	which philosophical	investigations	can	be	speculative	and	yet	exact	and	scientific	in	the	true sense.34	Principle	(a)	therefore	allows	for	a	unitary	sense	of	science	by	virtue	of	the identity	of	methods	between	philosophy	and	natural	sciences	(insofar	as	they	deal	with the	same	objects,	i.e.,	physical	phenomena),	while	leaving	room	for	a	kind	of	exactness	in philosophy	which	makes	it	scientific	in	a	broader	sense	than	that	implied	by	the	strict commonality	of	methods	referred	to	in	thesis	4.35 31 In particular, it is directed against Schelling's view that philosophy should cut itself off from all domains of "ordinary knowledge" (gemeines Wissen), as programmatically announced in the first issue of his New Journal for Speculative Physics (Schelling 1802, p. 34; 1859, p. 262). This passage has often been quoted in the school of Brentano as the example par excellence of the dangers of speculative idealism in philosophy. See Brentano (1929, p. 104) or Stumpf (1908, p. 17). 32 See Brentano (1987, p. 6) and Oberkofler (1989:5). 33 See Brentano (1968:127) and (Sauer 2000, p. 124) 34 See Brentano (1987:303) 35 See also Haller (1993) for a similar reading, which makes it possible to draw a direct connection between Brentano's fourth thesis and the Vienna Circle's project of a unitary science. In his introduction to the philosophy of sciences that is much influenced by the Vienna circle, Richard von Mises (1939/1956) quotes Brentano's thesis 4 as an epigraph. On exactness as a method in descriptive psychology, see Mulligan (1989). 13 Principle	(b):	Anti-Kantianism Principle	(b)	follows	to	some	extent	from	thesis	1,	which	supports	principle	(a),	insofar as	the	rejection	of	speculative	idealism	is	concerned.	It	is	also	a	correlate	of	principle	(c). In	1866,	Brentano	argued	against	Kantianism,	albeit	only	an	aspect	of	Kant's	ideas, namely	his	philosophy	of	religion.	Thesis	6	is	a	nice	example	that	Brentano	used	to disclose	the	weaknesses	of	Kantianism. In	it	he	negates	Kant's	idea	that	the	design argument	for	the	existence	of	God	can	only	prove	an	order	of	the	world,	but	not	an author	of	the	world.	In	Kant's	view,	the	hypothesis	of	a	creator	of	the	world	on	the	basis of	observed	causal	relations	between	phenomena	is	not	justified	because	the	gap between	empirical	data	and	their	relations	and	the	absolute	determinations	of	the highest	cause	of	the	world	is	unbridgeable.36	Brentano	argues,	against	this	view,	that Kant's	conclusion	simply	stands	square	with	his	own	conception	of	synthetic	a	priori truths:	after	all,	if	Kant	holds	the	law	of	causality	to	be	a	synthetic	a	priori	truth,	then	the fact	that	we	do	not	experience	God	as	a	primary	cause	cannot	possibly	be	an	obstacle	to the	design	argument.37	Besides,	Brentano	argues,	the	assumption	of	a	creator	is reasonable	simply	on	the	basis	of	the	probability	calculus,	and	does	not	involve	reliance on	the	cosmological	or	ontological	arguments,	as	Kant	contends. Thesis	7	deals	with	Kant's	discussion	of	God	as	ens	realissimum	in	the	Critique	of Pure	Reason	(B	604ff).	Brentano	argues	that	Kant	is	wrong	in	saying	that	the	existence	of God	as	a	creator	does	not	imply	God's	infinite	perfection.	The	argument	supporting	the thesis	can	be	deductively	construed:	supposing	that	a	creator	exists,	we	can	deduce	the creator's	infinite	perfection,	since	to	"create	out	of	nothing"	means	to	have	an unconditioned	effect;	having	such	an	unconditioned	creative	effect	is	incommensurably superior	to	having	a	conditioned	effect,	and	having	an	unconditioned	effect	is	not possible	by	simply	adding	conditioned	and	finite	effects;	therefore,	if	God	exists,	by deduction,	he	must	have	infinite	perfection.38 The	argument	behind	thesis	6	is	a	central	element	in	Brentano's	anti-Kantianism: if	synthetic	a	priori	truths	are	truths	that	obtain	independently	of	experience,	and	if temporal	and	spatial	determinations	are	forms	of	our	understanding,	then	any	synthetic a	priori	truth	about	temporal	or	spatial	determination	is	simply	made	true	by	our understanding,	which	is	a	standard	to	which	even	Kant	himself	cannot	live	up	to. 36 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (B: 651-658). 37 See Brentano (1968, p. 86) and Hoppenstedt (1933:64). 38 See also Brentano (1929:171). 14 Therefore,	excluding	experience	as	one	of	the	foundations	of	knowledge	gives	us	at	best "blind	prejudices,"	Brentano's	epithet	for	Kant's	synthetic	a	priori	truths.39 In	Brentano's	opinion,	Kant	and	Reid	adopt	the	same	basic	idea	that	there	are common	sense	judgments	–	judgments	which,	though	they	are	not	evident,	appear	to	be certain	and	likely	to	found	a	science.	On	Brentano's	view,	Kant	goes	too	far	in	his	fight against	skepticism	by	asserting	that	the	objects	of	knowledge	are	given	to	us	in	blind judgments.	Brentano	therefore	rejects	synthetic	a	priori	judgments	not	because	they	are a	priori,	but	because	their	correctness	cannot	be	"seen"	–	i.e.,	because	they	are	"blind." For	him,	accepting	blind	judgments	(blinde	Vorurteile)	as	the	basis	of	our	knowledge, and	establishing	the	existence	of	God,	the	immortality	of	the	soul	and	free	will	as postulates	of	practical	pure	reason,	is	a	symptom	of	the	utmost	decay.40 Brentano	spent	considerable	energy	arguing	against	all	aspects	of	Kantian philosophy,	for	instance	in	a	posthumously	published	work	against	Kant	written	in	1903 and	entitled	"Down	with	Prejudices!	A	Warning	to	the	Present	in	the	Spirit	of	Bacon	and Descartes	to	Free	Itself	from	All	Blind	A	Prioris."41	Even	the	construction	of	his	lectures on	metaphysics	from	1867/68	is	utterly	anti-Kantian:	he	begins,	as	Kant	does	in	the Critique	of	Pure	Reason,	with	the	"transcendental	philosophy,"	but	concludes	this opening	section	in	direct	opposition	to	Kant: We	have	concluded	our	apology	of	what	Kant	would	have	called	the transcendental	part	of	metaphysics.	We	now	proceed	to	investigate	what	might	be called,	in	his	language,	transcendent.	He	stops	here.	From	the	standpoint	of	his conclusions,	he	forbids	us	to	carry	on.	However,	his	conclusion	is	not	ours.	He	ends up	with	a	skeptical	attitude	[that	maintains]	the	unknowability	of	the	thing	in	itself and	the	subjectivity	of	our	principles.	We,	in	contrast,	have	seen	that	we	do	have indubitable	principles.42 Principle	(c):	Empiricism As	in	the	case	of	principle	(a),	the	general	principle	(c)	has	two	different	domains	of application	in	Brentano's	philosophy.	In	metaphysics,	his	empiricism	takes	the	form	of	a critique	of	skepticism	towards	the	possibility	of	knowledge	and	of	a	rejection	of dogmatism.	Brentano	argues	for	two	kinds	of	immediately	evident	knowledge: 39 See Brentano (1926/1998, p. 26/99). 40 Brentano (1926, p. 22) 41 In Brentano (1925). 42 Quoted and translated in Baumgartner (2013, p. 233). 15 1) axioms,	which	include	tautologies,	universal	predications	(e.g.,	"red	is	a	color"), predications	of	a	basis	for	some	being	(e.g.,	"everything	which	is	colored	is extended"),	the	truth	of	a	correlative	(e.g.,	"if	a	is	bigger	than	b,	then	b	is	smaller than	a"),	mereological	truths	(e.g.,	"if	a	lion	exists,	then	the	heart	of	a	lion	exists", or	"if	there	is	a	body,	there	is	a	surface"),	the	determinateness	of	that	which	is incompletely	presented	(e.g.,	"a	color	is	either	red,	blue,	white,	etc."),	essential relations	(e.g.,	"10	metres	is	twice	as	long	as	5	metres"),	the	necessity	of	a position,	form,	or	ordering	in	a	continuum	(e.g.,	"3	p.m.	is	earlier	than	4	p.m.),	and double	negation.43 2) Inner	perceivings	(e.g.,	the	knowledge	that	I	am	presently	hearing	(when	I	do), the	knowledge	that	I	want	to	sleep	(when	I	do),	etc.). Metaphysics	is	not	only	based	on	immediate	evident	knowledge,	but	also	on	mediate (and	thus	only	probable)	knowledge,	which	is	obtained	through	induction	from	repeated observations.	This	kind	of	knowledge	is	what	Brentano	calls	a	"physical	certainty"	of what	is	given	in	external	perception. Being	built	on	these	two	sources	of	immediate	evident	knowledge	and	on	the "physical	certainty"	of	mediate	knowledge	of	outer	perception	secures	the	empirical grounds	of	metaphysics.	Of	course,	physical	certainty	is	not	evidence:	this	is	why	the beings	Brentano	investigates	are	not	simply	the	table	out	there,	and	also	not	the	"things heard"	or	the	"things	seen,"	but	rather	the	"hearer-of-a-tone"	or	the	"seer-of-a-bird." Only	in	this	form	are	substances	accessible	to	inner	perception.44 The	second	domain	of	application	of	principle	(c)	is	psychology	per	se.	For Brentano,	psychology	relies	on	the	same	two	sources	of	knowledge	as	metaphysics: "physical	certainty"	obtained	by	induction	from	observation	via	outer	perception,	and evident	knowledge,	based	either	on	inner	perception	or	on	the	self-evidence	of	axioms. Psychology	is	therefore	an	empirical	science	with	respect	to	the	laws	of	succession between	phenomena,	the	explanation	of	their	causes,	and	the	prediction	of	further phenomena	–	which	are	laws	obtained	by	induction	–	but	also	regarding	innerly perceived	phenomena,	which	are	subject	to	self-evident	laws. Principle	(d):	The	mereological	nature	of	substance 43 See Brentano (1867b: 31766). 44 Smith (1987) aptly calls Brentano's beings "augmented substances." 16 As	we	have	seen	above,	Brentano	defends	a	conception	of	beings	as	substances	that	are augmented	by	their	attributes	or	accidents.	There	are	no	isolated	substances:	substances are	not	separable	from	their	accidents.	Rather,	substances	with	their	accidents,	that which	he	also	calls	"things,"	are	to	be	taken	as	metaphysical	wholes. This	conception	of	substances	as	wholes	is called	a	"mereological"	conception, with	reference	to	Twardowski's	student	Leśniewski,	who	coined	this	name	for	the theory	of	the	formal	relations	between	a	whole	and	its	parts.	The	basic	principle	(d)	is supported	by	Brentano's	homonymic	reading	of	Aristotle's	concept	of	being.	In Brentano's	view,	all	senses	of	Being	–	being	in	the	sense	of	accidental	being,	in	the	sense of	the	true,	in	the	sense	of	being	possible	and	in	the	sense	of	the	categories	–	are derivative	from	the	fundamental	meaning	of	being	according	to	the	categories.45	To	put it	differently,	the	first	substance	is	included	in	the	focal	meaning	of	all	the	ways	in	which we	speak	of	being,	all	of	which	express	"modes	of	existence	in	the	first	substance" (Brentano	1862/1975:	178/118).46 Principle	(d)	suggests,	in	the	line	of	Aquinas	and	Aristotle,	that	accidentis	esse	est inesse,	i.e.,	that	the	being	of	accidents	is	an	inexistence	(inwohnen)	in	the	substance.	"The substance	which	has	a	quality	is	neither	the	quality	nor	the	possessing	of	the	quality,	but still	the	possessing	of	the	quality	is	not	for	the	substance	a	further	quality.	Rather,	the possessing	of	a	quality	is	essentially	identical	with	the	substance"	(See	Brentano	1867b: 31792).47	In	his	1874	Psychology,	Brentano	steps	back	on	this	mereological	relation	of inwohnen	and	characterizes	intentionality	as	the	'inwohnen'	of	an	object	in	a	mental	act. Principle	(e):	the	correctness	principle Brentano's	conception	of	value	in	terms	of	desire-worthiness	(1866)	or	love-worthiness (1889)	is	already	set	out	as	one	of	the	25	theses	in	1866.	Although	some	elements	of	the theory	are	present	in	his	Vienna	lectures	on	practical	philosophy,48	the	account	was	first presented	in	print	in	1889:	"We	call	something	good,	if	love	of	it	is	correct.	What	is	to	be loved	with	correct	love,	what	is	worthy	of	love,	is	the	good	in	the	widest	sense." (Brentano	1889:	17,	translation	modified).	This	is	the	basic	fitting	attitude	account	of 45 Brentano relies here on Aristotle's Metaphysics, 1003b6-10. 46 On this interpretation of Brentano's reading of Aristotle's homonymic conception of being as substance, see for instance Owen (1960) and Shields (1999:217ff). 47 The same idea is discussed in Brentano's first project of a PhD dissertation on Suarez from the early 1860s. See Brentano (frühe Schriften: 1000054)). 48 Brentano (1952/1973). 17 value	that	Brentano	proposed	–	years	before	Ewing	(1947)	and	Scanlon	(1998)	–	in which	evaluative	categories	are	accounted	for	in	terms	of	deontic	categories.	Brentano defended	two	variants	of	the	theory.	According	to	the	first	(Brentano	1889;	Brentano 1930),	some	of	our	emotions	are	correct	because	they	are	in	harmony	with	the	value	of the	object	(Brentano	1930:25).	The	second	view	has	sometimes	been	characterized	as the	orthonomy	view	(Kraus	1937):	to	say	that	our	emotions	are	correct	is	just	to	say	that they	are	experienced	or	known as	correct	(Brentano	uses	here	"characterized	as correct",	als	richtig	charakterisiert).49	In	this	context,	love	is	a	higher	mode	of	taking pleasure	in	something.50 It	should	be	added	also	that	principle	(e)	holds	not	only	for emotions,	but	also	for	judgments.	The	judgment	expressed	by	"a	exists"	is	true,	Brentano argues,	if	and	only	if	acknowledging	(anerkennen)	the	existence	of	a	is	correct.51	We	will return	to	the	correctness	principle	in	section	3	below. 3. The	phenomenology	of	Brentano	and	Husserl Despite	the	variety	of	stances	which	Brentano	expressed	on	ontology,	metaphysics,	and psychology	over	the	course	of	his	career,	these	five	principles	remain	central	to	his whole	philosophy	throughout:	they	have	an	important	place	in	what	could	be	called Brentano's	philosophical	worldview	or	system.52	By	extension,	they	also	are	essential	to his	conception	of	phenomenology.	Since	Husserl's	phenomenology	grew	out	of Brentanian	soil	–	although	other	influences,	from	Bolzano	and	Frege,	are	essential	to understanding	its	specificities	(see	below)	–	let	us	now	turn	to	the	central	issues	in	the two	thinkers'	accounts	of	phenomenology,	and	to	their	respective	applications	of	the principles	mentioned	above. Phenomenology,	Phenomena,	and	Experiences Brentano	introduced	phenomenology	as	a	philosophical	discipline	in	his	first	lectures	on metaphysics	in	Vienna	in	1877/78.53	He	first	used	the	term	'phenomenology'	to characterize	research	into	the	contents	of	mental	states,	only	later	(in	Vienna) expanding	the	lexicon	of	the	discipline	with	the	expressions	"descriptive	psychology," 49 Brentano (1889/1902, p. 19-20/18). 50 On Brentano's orthonomy view, see Kraus (1937, pp. 165ff) and Mulligan (forthcoming). 51 On Brentano's theory of judgment, see Brandl (2014). 52 On Brentano's worldview, see Fréchette (forthcoming-a). On Brentano's philosophical system, see Kriegel (forthcoming). 53 See Masaryk's notes on Brentano's metaphysics lectures in Masaryk (1877/78), where phenomenology is described as a "part of metaphysics." 18 "psychognosy,"	or	"phenomenognosy."	As	a	part	of	metaphysics,	phenomenology	was then	introduced	as	a	form	of	investigation	that	precedes	ontology	but	follows	the	socalled	"transcendental	philosophy,"	the	part	of	metaphysics	that	deals	with	skepticism and	the	arguments	against	it.	In	this	context,	phenomenology	was	introduced	as	an "investigation	on	the	contents	of	our	presentations"	(Brentano	1867b:	31739),	dealing with	the	ways	substance	appears,	in	opposition	to	the	ways	substance	is. The	motivation	behind	Brentano's	introduction	of	phenomenology	as	a	sort	of preliminary	to	ontology	is	not	very	well	documented.	Whewell's	(1847)	History	of Inductive	Sciences	made	a	strong	impression	on	the	young	Brentano,	and	may	have influenced	him	in	this	context.54	Notably,	Whewell's	proposed	distinction	between explicative-causal	(aetiological)	and	descriptive	(phenomenological)	sciences	is	palpable in	Brentano's	early	manuscripts	on	the	classification	of	the	sciences.55	This	distinction also	played	a	role	later	on,	in	Brentano's	explanation	of	the	role	of	descriptive psychology	in	his	Viennese	lectures,	when	he	used	an	analogy	with	the	distinction between	geognosy	and	geology	to	illustrate	the	distinction	between	phenomenology	and psychology	more	generally.56 Introducing	phenomenology	into	metaphysics	allows	Brentano	to	distinguish	a field	of	investigation	on	the	ways	substance	appears,	as	opposed	to	the	ways	substance is	(ontology).	Principles	(a)	and	(c)	in	particular	establish	the	possibility	of	a	scientific investigation	of	phenomena	as	the	first	step	in	gaining	knowledge	of	the	nature	of substance.	This	also	follows	from	principle	(d),	insofar	as	we	have	intuitions	of individual	substances	only	through	their	perceived	accidents.	In	this	sense, phenomenology	is	not	simply	a	preliminary	to	ontology,	but	also	provides	it	with	its tools	of	analysis	and	its	epistemic	security.	As	inner	perception,	which	is phenomenology's	field	of	investigation,	shows	us	mental	phenomena	as	really	existing, so	is	the	existence	of	their	parts,	especially	the	logical	and	metaphysical	parts,	also 54 Brentano had an annotated copy of the History of Inductive Sciences in his library, as well Mill's book on Comte (Mill 1868) in a French translation. 55 See for instance Brentano (EL75, 12921–12), where the distinction between descriptive (beschreibende) and causal (nach Wirkungen) sciences. This distinction also played a central role in Schlöder (1852), another work that the young Brentano received as a prize and annotated. The distinction between the science of objects and the science of phenomena is discussed in Schlöder (1852, xxv); Brentano refers to it in the aforementioned manuscript. 56 See Brentano (1982/1995, p. 6/7-8) and Brentano (1895, p. 34). 19 secured	by	inner	perception.57	Phenomenology	therefore	makes	authentic	metaphysical knowledge	possible. The	introduction	of	phenomenology	into	metaphysics	coincides	more	or	less	with Brentano's	more	intensive	research	in	psychology,	and	as	such	is	an	application	of principle	(d)	to	the	empirical	study	of	the	mind.	Psychology	as	a	science	of	the	mind investigates	nothing	other	than	the	qualities	of	the	substance,	i.e.,	in	this	specific case,	the	qualities	of	soul.	This	is	also	why	Brentano	often	speaks	positively	of	Lange's "psychology	without	a	soul,"58	although	for	him	it	merely	means	that	psychology	can only	investigate	the	phenomena	through	which	the	soul	is	given	to	us	–	what	Brentano calls	psychical	phenomena,	which	are	only	perceivable	innerly.	But	psychology	is	not only	an	investigation	of	soul	through	its	phenomena:	it	also	involves	a	study	of	their origins	and	their	succession,	an	explanation	of	their	causes,	and	the	prediction	of	further phenomena.	This	part	of	the	psychological	investigation	is	what	Brentano	sometimes calls	"genetic	psychology."	Since	the	causes	of	phenomena,	their	succession,	and	their prediction	involve	physical	processes	existing	in	the	natural	world,	psychology	must follow	the	same	methods	as	natural	sciences:	observation,	deduction,	and	induction, insofar	as	they	are	applicable	to	the	objects	of	their	investigation,	as	formulated	in principle	(a).	Psychology,	and	more	particularly	genetic	psychology,	is	therefore involved	with	the	same	phenomena	as	the	natural	sciences.	These	are	called	physical phenomena.	Here	we	see	the	full	consequences	of	thesis	4:	a	subset	of	philosophy	(which includes	metaphysics	and	psychology)	shares	the	same	objects	as	the	natural	sciences (physical	phenomena)	and	must	therefore	apply	the	same	methods	to	their investigation. Within	this	strict	framework,	Brentano	considers	psychical	phenomena	the	main object	of	the	part	of	psychology	he	calls	phenomenology	or	descriptive	psychology.	What are	the	essential	features	of	psychical	phenomena?	After	all,	a	natural	scientist,	or physiologist,	could	well	argue	that	they	are	reducible	to	physical	phenomena.	This	is	one 57 See Brentano (1867a: 31739): "When it is formulated in general, the question of the existence of realities belongs to ontology. If we would call everything that is not intentional an external thing, the question of the existence of external things would be the first question of ontology. But this is not the usage. We do not use to call our own mental phenomena in this way... The question about what is real is thereby already partially answered. The existence of phenomena of inner perception, and thereby the existence of their parts, in particular of the logical and metaphysical parts". 58 Brentano (1874/2015, p. 27/22). 20 of	Brentano's	most	patent	concerns	in	his	Psychology,	and	it	is	also	the	motivation behind	his	arguments	on	the	irreducibility	of	the	mental	to	the	physical.	He	offers different	arguments	–	on	the	absence	of	extension	of	psychical	phenomena,	on	their inner	perceivability,	and	so	on.	But	what	he	considers	to	be	the	"most	excellent"	trait	of mental	phenomena	over	physical	phenomena	is	their	intentionality,	i.e.,	the	fact	that they	are	directed	toward	something	as	their	object. In	Husserl's	view,	it	was	this	feature	of	psychical	phenomena	that	was	the	most important.	Early	enough,	however,	Husserl	was	dissatisfied	with	Brentano's	concept	of psychical	phenomena.	His	main	concern	was	that	calling	both	these	mental	acts	and their	objects	"phenomena"	is	misleading,	since	it	gives	the	impression	that	the	apparent things	(e.g.,	the	red	spot	I	am	seeing)	"only	appear	as	analogues	of	sensations"	(Husserl 1901a/2001:	235/342),	and	not	as	properties	of	the	corresponding	objects.	Husserl	did not	formally	accuse	Brentano	of	this	confusion,	but	his	way	of	avoiding	the	confusion	is also	a	rejection	of	Brentano's	view: "If	an	external	object	(a	house)	is	perceived,	presenting	sensations	are experienced	in	this	perception,	but	they	are	not	perceived.	When	we	are deluded	regarding	the	existence	of	the	house,	we	are	not	deluded	regarding the	existence	of	our	experienced	sense-contents,	since	we	do	not	pass judgment	on	them	at	all,	do	not	perceive	them	in	this	perception	(Husserl 1901a/2001,	pp.	237/344-5). Therefore,	we	should	distinguish	between	my	experiencing	(Erleben)	of	sensecontents	(my	having	physical	phenomena)	and	my	perceiving	the	house.	The	color	spots I	am	experiencing	may	be	called	physical	phenomena,	but	it	would	be	wrong,	according to	Husserl,	to	call	such	an	experience	a	perception,	and	a	fortiori	a	delusive	perception. Although	experience	may	involve	position	taking	(Wahr-Nehmung),	the	position	taking is	not	constitutive	of	what	an	experience	(Erlebnis)	is.59 At	least	since	Gadamer	(1985,	pp.	157ff)	and	Heidegger,	the	conceptual	history	of Erlebnis	has	usually	been	traced	back	to	Dilthey	and	the	philosophy	of	life (Lebensphilosophie),	a	movement	to	which	the	early	Husserl	has	been	associated.60	In fact	however,	Husserl's	term,	concept	and	use	of	Erlebnis,	or	das	Erlebte,	was	already 59 Husserl's concept of experience is in some way similar to Dretske's "non-epistemic seeing" (Dretske 1969), since these two concepts describe a level of sensory experience which doesn't involve conceptual structure. However, contra Dretske, Husserl rejects the idea that epistemic seeing is only a"seeing that". 60 On similar views, see Cohen and Moran (2012, p. 195) and Carr (2014, pp. 20ff) 21 present	in	Brentano's	lectures	on	psychology	in	1887	and	1891.	A	discussion	of	the experienced	(das	Erlebte)	can	be	found	in	the	few	pages	of	Husserl's	notes	on	this lectures	which	are	still	extant.61 The	basic	reason	for	Husserl's	preference	for	Erlebnisse	over	phenomena	is	to avoid	the	confusion	between	two	kinds	of	phenomena,	physical	and	psychical, considered	as	the	respective	objects	of	two	kinds	of	perception,	outer	and	inner,	where only	the	former	can	lead	to	delusion.	Up	to	this	point,	Brentano	would	still	agree.	The difference	is	that	for	Husserl,	perceiving	is	not	experiencing:	perception	involves interpretation	(Auffassung),	whereas	experiencing	is	just	access	to	sensory	data	prior	to any	interpretation.	Brentano	indeed	often	seems	to	overlook	this	difference,	since	for him	experiencing	is	perceiving,	and	perception	itself	is	a	judgment	and	therefore	a position-taking.	Furthermore,	Husserl's	use	of	the	broader	concept	of	Erlebnisse,	instead of	the	narrower	concept	of	mental	phenomena,	allows	him	to	isolate	a	category	of mental	acts	which	are	not	intentional.	Distinguishing	between	experiencing	and perceiving	allows	him	to	reserve	intentionality	for	perceptions	and	for	some	lived experiences.	For	Husserl,	intentionality	is	not	the	mark	of	lived	experiences. Description	and	its	tools Exactness.	Brentano's	descriptive	psychology	and	Husserl's	phenomenology	have	in common	the	search	for	exactness,	both	in	the	descriptions	themselves	and	in	the analysis	used.	Brentano's	descriptive	psychology	lectures,	for	instance,	develop	at	length on	possible	arguments	in	the	debate	between	empiricism	and	nativism	on	space perception.	Brentano	and	most	of	his	students	defended	the	nativist	account	according to	which	space	is	not	deduced	from	experience,	but	is	a	concrete	element	of	our experience.	This	obsession	with	exactitude	in	argumentation	and	description	is	also attested	by	Stumpf	(1924/1930,	p.	210/394),	and	manifest	in	many	other	works	from the	school	of	Brentano.62	Husserl	also	expresses	a	similar	concern	in	his	argument	in	the fifth	logical	investigation	(Husserl	2001,	pp.	146-170),	in	which	he	explores	different 61 Husserl had a large collection of lecture notes from Brentano's lectures, which he donated to the Brentano Society in Prague in 1930. These were obviously destroyed during the war since no traces of them are left. A fragment of Husserl's lecture notes on the 1887 descriptive psychology lectures (copied from the notes of Schmidkunz) does give evidence of the Brentanian origin of Erlebnis and Erlebte: "When I say that descriptive psychology describes what is experienced in immediate experience (das in unmittelbar Erfahrung Erlebte), I am not talking about an enumeration of individual cases, but about what is generally characteristic about the elements that remain while the composition changes." On "experiencing", see also Brentano (1982/1995). 62 On exactness in the School of Brentano, see Mulligan (1986). 22 alternative	interpretations	of	the	thesis	that	every	act	is	a	presentation	or	has	a presentation	as	a	basis. Examples.	Another	central	element	of	the	methodology	of	descriptive	psychology	is	the use	of	examples.	All	of	the	descriptive	cases	in	Brentano's	descriptive	psychology	start from	examples:	this	is	a	principle	which	Bolzano	called	an	explication	(Verständigung)	in the	narrow	sense,	for	cases	where	a	conceptual	analysis	is	not	available.	Brentano	uses the	same	technique	for	descriptive	psychology: A	very	specific	technique	[i.e.,	of	descriptive	psychology]	often	makes	it necessary	to	bring	someone	else	to	pay	attention	to	something	which	he	at the	outset	simply	cannot	find,	which	he	even	puts	decisively	and	literally	into question. 1.	Demonstration	of	examples,	where	[something]	is	[there]	and	is not.	2.	Exposition	of	the	consequences.	3.	Evidence	(Nachweis)	from experimentations. Furthermore,	the	technique	necessitates	a	specific	practice	(Übung)	whose most	essential	preconditions	are	still	missing,	as	long	as	experiments	are conducted	no	less	than	unmethodically	or	following	poor	methods.	Finally,	it requires	in	particular	a	certain	division	of	labor,	which	is	almost	never practiced	in	the	philosophical	domain.	(Brentano-forthcoming)	[1887:	157-8] Husserl	too	presents	phenomenology	as	a	philosophy	that	begins	with	examples.	Large parts	of	the	Logical	Investigations	are	built	on	what	Husserl	calls	"analyses	of	examples" (Bespielsanalysen),	which	are	an	essential	part	of	any	argument.	This	practice	is	drawn directly	from	Brentano's	descriptive	psychology.	In	the	preface	to	his	Philosophy	of Arithmetics	for	instance,	Husserl	stresses	the	fact	that	he	does	not	use	any	terminology which	is	not	introduced	by	examples	or	definitions.63 Eidetic	variations:	Eidetic	variations	build	on	the	Beispielsanalysen:	their	aim,	in Husserl's	method,	is	to	gain	knowledge	of	necessities.	For	example,	seeing	a	white	coffee cup,	we	may	ask	"What	holds	up	amid	such	free	variations	of	an	original...as	the invariant,	the	necessary,	universal	form,	the	essential	form,	without	which	something	of that	kind...	would	be	altogether	inconceivable?"	(Husserl	1962/1977,	p.	72/54).	At	some point,	in	imaginatively	varying	the	coffee	cup,	we	come	up	with	features	that	cannot	be 63 Husserl (1891/2003, p. VII/6): "I have made sparse use of philosophical terminology, which is rather indeterminate in any case. In particular, I have used no terms not sufficiently clarified through definition or examples." 23 varied	without	making	the	object	itself	inconceivable	(as	a	coffee	cup),	e.g.,	that	it	is	not a	receptacle	for	liquid. Husserl's	use	of	what	he	calls	eidetic	variations	is	reminiscent	of	Bolzano's	use	of	the logic	of	variation	in	his	Wissenschaftslehre	(Bolzano	1837/2014),	a	book	Husserl	knew very	well. Reduction:	In	fact,	when	Husserl	first	introduced	the	phenomenological	reduction	in	a Seefeld	manuscript	from	1905,	he	began	with	the	example	of	a	beer	bottle: "I	see	a	beer	bottle	that	is	brown,	and	I	restrict	myself	to	the	brown	in	its extension,	'just	as	it	is	actually	given'...	I	perceive	–	this	brown	content.	It	is something	that	endures.	It	is	constantly	the	same.	It	covers	a	certain phenomenological	extension.	I	saw	it	yesterday;	I	remember	it	today.	It	has	lasted until	today.	Transcendence!"	(Husserl	1966/1991,	p.	238/245-246). For	Husserl,	the	focus	on	what	is	"actually	given,"	bracketing	all	further	assumptions	on the	nature	or	existence	of	the	objects	perceived,	has	the	function	of	neutralizing	our dogmatic	attitude	towards	reality	–	what	he	also	calls	a	naïve	metaphysical	attitude	–	in order	to	make	us	aware	of	our	active	contributions	in	our	commerce	with	the	world,	as in	our	apprehension	of	objects.	Bracketing	the	natural	attitude	towards	the	beer	bottle allows	us	to	"see"	how	this	object	is	constituted	through	meaning-bestowing	acts,	i.e., how	its	"sense"	(Sinn)	is	constituted,	and	how	this	sense	determines	our	apprehension of	the	object. After	1913	Husserl	developed	this	idea	in	detail	in	vast	analyses	of	how	the	most diverse	aspects	of	reality	are	constituted:	meaning,	time-consciousness,	the	experienced body,	intersubjectivity	and	intersubjective	reality,	and	even	the	world	itself	as	we experience	it:	our	life-world	(Lebenswelt). The	mechanism	at	work,	the	"bracketing"	that	is	characteristic	of	the phenomenological	reduction	in	the	works	that	Husserl	published	after	1913,	is	at bottom	quite	similar	to	the	stance	he	defended	in	the	Logical	Investigations,	and	which he	called	there	the	"metaphysical	neutrality"	of	phenomenology.	In	this	context,	he argued	that	questions	concerning	the	possibility	of	knowledge	or	on	whether	there	is	an external	reality	should	be	rejected	as	metaphysical	questions,	which	have	no	place	in 24 phenomenology	(see	for	instance	1901/2001a,	p.	26/pp.	177-8).	Many	other	similar affirmations	can	be	found	throughout	the	Logical	Investigations.64	Like phenomenological	reduction,	metaphysical	neutrality	is	a	methodological	device	which defines	the	domain	of	phenomenological	research,	namely	"phenomena":	i.e.,	what	is directly	given	to	us.	In	both	cases,	we	refrain	from	metaphysical	assumptions	on	the nature	of	perceived	colors,	tones,	and	even	on	the	nature	or	existence	of	consciousness. Despite	this	important	similarity,	phenomenological	reduction	differs	in	two fundamental	aspects	from	the	stance	of	metaphysical	neutrality.	First,	the	former	is	a generalization	of	the	latter,	which	ranges	not	only	over	the	objects	of	perception,	but over	all	possible	objects	tout	court.	Second,	while	metaphysical	neutrality	is	a descriptivist	stance	–	it	aims	only	to	provide	a	phenomenologically	plausible	analysis	of our	experiences	and	their	contents	–	the	motivation	behind	phenomenological	reduction is	foundational,	which	makes	it	a	typical	idealist	(and	neo-Kantian)	device:	it	aims	to isolate	the	conditions	of	possibility	of	things	"just	as	they	are	actually	given." In	a Kantian-Cartesian	fashion,	Husserl	comes	to	the	conclusion	in	the	Ideas	that	since	I cannot	imagine	the	world	being	annihilated	without	imagining	being	myself	conscious	of this	annihilation,	then	subjectivity	must	be	considered	as	the	condition	of	possibility	for the	appearance	of	the	world.	This	is	Husserl's	'discovery	of	the	I,'	which	provides	the foundational	basis	of	his	analysis	of	constitution.	65 There	is	no	consensus	on	how	exactly	the	significance	of	the	foundationalist project	Husserl	pursued	in	the	Ideas	should	be	understood.	After	the	publication	of	the Ideas	in	1913,	Husserl's	own	students	and	close	collaborators	and	colleagues	–	Adolf Reinach,	Johannes	Daubert,	Max	Scheler,	Theodor	Conrad,	Alexander	Pfänder,	Edith Stein,	Jean	Héring,	Moritz	Geiger,	and	Roman	Ingarden	(to	name	only	a	few)	–	reacted	in different	ways	to	Husserl's	foundationalist	project,	but	in	general	they	had	one	of	two reactions:	either	they	dismissed	it	as	a	whole	or	they	remained	indifferent,	considering	it as	an	optional	and	therefore	inessential	way	of	understanding	phenomenological analysis.	Although	some	of	Husserl's	later	students	in	Freiburg	were	sympathetic	to	the foundationalist	project	–	among	them	Jan	Patocka,	Eugen	Fink,	Alfred	Schütz,	Ludwig Landgrebe,	and	Theodor	Celms	–	the	project	itself	only	survived	Husserl's	death	in	the 64 See also 1901/2001a: pp. 6/166, 129/249, 201/296; 1901/2001: pp. 401/106, 413/113, 729/317, 732/319. 65 Relevant passages on the reduction are to be found in Husserl (1913/1983, pp. 61-62/68-70; 73-74/85-87; 202204/236-239). 25 form	of	the	Gabelsberger	manuscripts,	which	have	been	progressively	published	since the	1950s. Even	today,	after	more	than	60	years	of	intensive	publication	of	Husserl's	manuscripts, there	is	still	no	consensus	on	the	nature	of	the	project.	One	widespread	interpretation among	Husserl	scholars	has	it	that	the	project	is	fully	foundationalist	and	that phenomenological	reduction	is	in	essence	a	refined	device	for	transcendental	idealism, which	gives	phenomenological	descriptions	their	validity	for	knowledge.	Another interpretation,	inspired	by	Føllesdal	(1969)	and	developed	further	by	Smith	and MacIntyre	(1982),	is	similar	in	spirit	to	the	'indifferent'	reaction	of	early phenomenologists:	either	with	or	without	foundationalist	concerns,	phenomenology essentially	gives	a	theory	of	our	meaning-bestowing	activities.	Therefore,	the foundationalist	project	is	optional. Intentionality These	two	takes	on	the	foundationalist	project	of	post-1913	phenomenology	are	best illustrated	by	the	different	conceptions	of	intentionality,	intentional	object,	and intentional	content	which	have	been	defended	by	phenomenologists	since	then.	Here, Brentano's	theory	of	intentionality	is	of	central	importance.	This	theory	is	one	of	the most	lasting	influences	of	his	thought,	not	only	on	Austro-German	philosophy	in	general, but	also	on	20th-century	philosophy,	both	in	the	post-Husserlian	phenomenological tradition	and	in	analytic	philosophy. The	basic	theory	of	intentionality.	Brentano	proposed	many	different descriptions	of	intentionality.	Common	to	all	of	them	is	the	claim	that	intentionality	is	a characteristic	property	of	something	mental	(an	act,	or	a	subject	in	the	reistic	phase), which	serves	as	a	means	to	classify	what	belongs	to	the	domain	of	the	mental	and	what to	the	domain	of	the	physical.	This	characteristic	property	is	what	Brentano	also	calls "direction	towards	an	object"	or	the	"immanent	objectivity"	of	an	act,	which	makes	the basic	theory	a	relational	theory	of	intentionality.	However,	these	two	further appellations	do	not	help	much,	since	they	seem	to	point	at	features	that	are	not obviously	identical:	the	fact	that	intentionality	is	aboutness	–	e.g.,	desiring	an	ice	cream is	an	intentional	state	which	is	about	an	ice	cream	–	and	the	fact	that	the	object	of	an intentional	act	is	"contained"	or	"intentionally	inexists"	in	the	act.	In	fact	these	two features	do	not	even	seem	to	be	compatible,	at	least	prima	facie:	if	my	desiring	an	ice 26 cream	is	intentional	and	if	intentional	objects	are	contained	in	the	act,	it	seems	that	I cannot	reasonably	desire	an	ice	cream	if	the	ice	cream	is	already	'contained'	in	my	act. It	has	been	usual	since	Chisholm	(1957,	p.	169)	to	consider	these	two appellations	as	expressions	of	one	and	the	same	feature.	On	Chisholm's	reading, Brentano	is	committed	to	the	view	that	intentional	objects	are	some	kind	of	intra-mental entities	enjoying	some	diminished	kind	of	existence. In	this	case,	my	desiring	an	ice cream	has	an	intentional	object,	the	"ice	cream	represented	and	desired,"	which	is distinct	from	the	dairy	product	that	I	may	subsequently	enjoy.66 It	is	questionable,	however,	whether	the	account	of	Brentano's	concept	of intentionality	that	Chisholm	sketches	is	a	faithful	reconstruction	of	Brentano's	ideas about	intentionality.	To	be	sure,	Brentano	himself	is	not	very	careful	in	his	description	of intentionality	in	the	Psychology	from	an	Empirical	Standpoint	(1874/2015,	p.	106/9293),	where	"content"	and	"object"	are	used	interchangeably.	This	may	be	explained	in many	ways.	Perhaps	the	most	important	to	mention	is	that	the	ontology	of	intentionality is	not	Brentano's	primary	concern	in	the	Psychology:	he	focuses	instead	on	the	dualism of	the	mental	and	the	physical	that	intentionality	grounds,	and	with	the	task	of psychology	as	a	science	of	phenomena.	In	the	latter	case,	it	indeed	makes	no	important difference	whether	the	phenomena	described	are	called	"contents"	or	"objects,"	since they	are	simply	phenomena.	This	is	why,	in	this	context,	the	ontological	implications	of intentionality	play	no	significant	role	in	the	project	conducted	in	the	Psychology. Despite	its	apparent	limitations	and	the	mainly	psychological	motivations	behind the	basic	theory,	it	has	the	advantage	of	ranging	over	all	mental	phenomena	and explaining	their	common	core,	notwithstanding	the	fact	that	we	sometimes	make perceptual	errors	or	think	of	objects	which	do	not	exist.	This	advantage	should	not	be underestimated,	as	it	allows	Brentano	to	offer	an	account	of	the	intentional	nature	of	our phenomenal	experiences.	What	it's	like	for	me	to	enjoy	an	ice	cream	is	something	which, on	the	face	of	it,	does	not	have	much	to	do	with	a	state	of	the	world,	and	yet	it	seems	that the	experience	of	tasting	an	ice	cream	has	an	intentional	object	which	is	the	content	of the	experience,	its	phenomenal	features,	which	seem	to	be	distinct	from	the	physical properties	of	the	dairy	product	perched	on	the	cone	in	my	hand.	This	is	the	gist	of	the formulation	we	find	in	Psychology	from	an	Empirical	Standpoint	concerning	the	contents 66 Chisholm (1967, p. 201); (1960, pp. 4-5.) I argue against this account in Fréchette (2013) and (2016a). 27 of	experience,	i.e.,	physical	phenomena:	"Knowledge,	joy,	desire,	exist	actually;	colour, tone,	warmth	only	phenomenally	and	intentionally." The	enhanced	theory.	The	basic	theory	offers	a	unified	relational	account	of intentionality	which	takes	seriously	the	fact	that	our	experience	has	phenomenal content	that	is	constitutive	of	the	intentionality	of	our	acts.	However,	it	does	not	say much	about	experiences	which	are	not	strictly	sensory	experiences.	My	disappointment about	winter	coming	too	soon	is	clearly	linked	in	a	significant	way	to	sensory	contents, but	such	contents	are	obviously	not	all	there	is	to	say	about	the	content	of	my disappointment.	The	basic	theory	displays	a	similar	shortcoming	with	regard	to judgment,	e.g.,	my	act	of	meaning	as	expressed	by	"2+2=4". In	the	Psychology	of	1874,	such	cases	were	presented	as	more	or	less	analogous to	sensory	experiences,	leaving	many	questions	open	as	to	how	abstract	presentational contents	or	the	contents	of	emotions	and	judgments	are	to	be	considered	in	some important	sense	as	sensory	and	yet	constituted	through	acts	which	are	essentially distinct	from	sensings.67	Brentano	considered	these	cases	in	more	detail	in	his	lectures on	logic	in	the	1870s	and	1880s,	and	also	in	his	lectures	on	descriptive	psychology	in	the 1880s	and	1890s.	At	least	for	the	case	of	acts	of	meaning,	but	plausibly	for	all	mental acts,	he	proposes	an	alternative	account	of	the	intentional	relation.	Since	these	texts	are still	unpublished,	it	may	be	worth	quoting	some	of	the	passages	detailing	his	account	of acts	of	meaning	at	length	here: Like	names,	assertions	too	have	a	double	reference: (a)	to	the	content	of	a	psychical phenomenon	as	such;	(b)	to	a	putative	external	object.	The	first	is	the	meaning. (EL80:	61-62)....	The	name	manifests	a	mental	phenomenon,	[it]	means	[bedeutet] the	content	of	a	presentation	as	such	(the	immanent	object?),	[and]	it	names	that which	is	presented	through	the	content	of	a	presentation.	We	say	about	this:	the name	is	attributed	to	it.	What	one	names	are	the	real	objects	of	the	presentation which	–	if	they	exist,	are	the	external	objects	of	the	presentation.	(One	names	through the	mediation	of	meaning)	(EL81:13528)...	I	call	the	presented	as	presented	the content	of	the	presentation.	I	call	object	of	the	presentation	the	presented	under	the guise	through	which	it	is	presented	(if	it	exists).	There	always	is	a	content	when something	is	presented.	But	the	presentation	often	lacks	an	object.	Many	different objects	can	correspond	to	one	single	content	of	presentation.	And	one	single	object can	correspond	to	many	different	contents	of	presentation	(PS48)....	The	name	... expresses	the	presentation	in	such	a	way	that	it	names	that	which	is	presented	by 67 Brentano and his early students – Stumpf and Marty – made many attempts in lectures and correspondence to account for this fact, particularly through sophisticated conceptions of abstraction. See Fréchette (2015a) and (forthcoming-b) on these various attempts. 28 the	presentation,	and	it	names	it	under	its	mediation	and	for	this	reason	completely or	incompletely	determined	(or	undetermined)	in	the	same	way	as	it	presents	it.	In this	way,	the	presentation	is	the	sense	(Sinn)	of	the	name;	the	thing	is	that	which	is named	by	the	name	and	in	the	most	proper	sense	that	which	is	designated	through it...(EL72,	12578-9). It	is	thus	fair	to	suppose	that	the	basic	account	was	not	Brentano's	last	word	on intentionality.	Between	the	1870s	and	the	beginning	of	the	20th	century,	Brentano developed	the	enhanced	view	that	at	least	some	mental	acts,	namely	meaning	acts, involve	a	distinction	between	the	content	and	the	object	of	the	presentation,	the judgment,	or	the	act	of	desire.	Especially	in	the	1880s	and	afterward,	this	distinction	was popularized	in	print	by	Twardowski	(1894/1977)	and	Meinong	(1899/1978). According	to	the	enhanced	theory,	when	I	utter	"The	Sun	exists,"	the	content	of my	judgment	is	the	state	of	affairs,	or	the	'Sun's	existence,'	and	the	object	is	the	Sun. When	I	use	the	name	"table"	to	express	some	mental	content,	this	content	is	different than	the	object	I	am	referring	to,	since	the	object	may	or	may	not	exist,	although	the content	(the	Presented	as	such)	necessarily	exists. In	this	theory,	the	intentional	content	plays	the	role	of	a	mediator,	what	Brentano calls	sometimes	a	sense	(Sinn),	sometimes	a	meaning	(Bedeutung).	Brentano's	Sinne	are mental	entities	of	a	special	kind:	they	mediate	objects,	more	or	less	determinately, similarly	to	the	way	in	which	names	more	or	less	determinately	name	an	object.	The Sinne	are	not	the	content	of	intuitive	presentations,	since	intuitive	presentations	are	by nature	presentations	of	fully	determinate	content.	Rather,	they	are	the	content	of abstract	presentations.	To	some	extent,	Brentano's	conception	of	Sinne	in	the	enhanced theory	of	intentionality	prefigures	Frege's	concept	of	sense	in	Frege	(1892). The	reistic	version.	What	kind	of	entities,	then,	are	the	physical	phenomena	(also	called 'contents'	or	'objects')	according	to	the	basic	theory?	On	the	account	that	Brentano offered	in	his	later	self-criticisms,	he	conceived	them	as	entities	with	a	lesser	kind	of existence,	sometimes	described	as	their	"intentional	inexistence."	On	this	view,	they were	considered	as	irrealia,	in	opposition	to	real	existing	entities.	In	the	basic	theory, intentionality	was	thus	a	relationship	between	a	real	entity	and	an	unreal	entity. Since	it	is	not	systematically	developed	in	his	manuscripts,	it	is	hard	to	see exactly	what	kind	of	entities	stand	as	targets	in	the	enhanced	theory.	Since	Brentano accepted	objectless	presentations	back	then,	then	it	would	make	good	sense	to	see 29 external	objects	as	the	target	of	intentional	acts,	mediated	by	the	act's	correlate:	the intentional	content.	But	even	in	this	case,	the	enhanced	theory	does	not	provide	a comprehensive	account	of	intentionality,	which	would	be	relational	in	cases	of	existing objects,	although	allowing	for	non-relational	cases,	e.g.,	in	the	cases	of	the	presentation of	the	god	Jupiter	or	of	a	golden	mountain.68 Brentano	shifted	his	view	on	the	nature	of	intentionality	around	1904.	The	first two	theories	described	intentionality	in	terms	of	a	twoor	three-term	relationship.	The last	theory,	which	is	often	called	reism,	is	based	on	the	contrary	on	the	idea	that intentionality	is	a	special	kind	of	relation	(in	fact,	not	a	relation	in	the	proper	sense	of the	term),	which	in	all	cases	requires	a	foundation	(Fundament),	but	which	does	not require	an	existing	terminus	of	the	relation.	According	to	the	basic	theory,	my	desire	for an	ice	cream	is	a	relation	between	an	act	and	an	internal	entity;	on	the	enhanced	theory, it	is	a	three-term	relation	between	my	desire,	the	represented	object,	and	the	ice	cream (which	may	or	may	not	exist).	In	reism,	intentionality	is	spelled	out	in	terms	of	a foundation	(e.g.,	"ice-cream-Wisher"	that	I	present	in	recto)	which	has	a	terminus	in obliquo	(e.g.,	an	ice	cream).	The	"terminus	in	obliquo,"	however,	has	no	ontological power:	it	is	simply	an	aspect	of	the	Wisher	or	the	way	in	which	the	Wisher	wishes (e.g.,	as	wishing	ice-creamily).69 In	this	way,	Brentano	can	avoid	an	ontological commitment	to	intentional	entities	by	providing	a	theory	of	intentionality	that	holds equally	for	all	presentations. Husserl's	accounts	of	intentionality.	Let	us	return	now	for	a	moment	to Brentano's	enhanced	theory.	More	than	its	connection	with	Frege,	it	is	the	link	to Husserl's	theory	of	intentionality	that	seems	most	interesting.	The	enhanced	theory	that Brentano	developed	mostly	between	the	1870s	and	the	1890s	strongly	emphasizes	the distinction	between	content	and	object	in	cases	where	names	or	statements	are asserted,	and	clearly	states	that	in	some	cases,	a	name	expresses	a	presentation's content	but	does	not	name	any	object.	This	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	the distinction	between	content	and	object	only	holds	for	acts	of	meaning,70	but	it	is	at	least true	that	acts	of	meaning	are	the	cases	that	most	clearly	disclose	this	distinction.	In	this 68 The lack of comprehensiveness of the enhanced theory also affected his account of truth from the same period, which has been characterized recently as a "deflationist account" (Brandl 2017). 69 This is also why Brentano's reistic theory is often described as an adverbial theory of intentionality. See Chisholm (1957) and Chrudzimski and Smith (2004). 70 Münch (2004, p. 222 fn) suggests such a view. 30 respect,	Husserl's	idea	that	directedness	toward	an	object	is	nothing	but	a	property	of acts	of	meaning,	as	developed	in	the	Logical	Investigations	and	in	line	with	Husserl (1991a/1999),	follows	and	radicalizes	Brentano's	enhanced	theory	wherein	acts	of meaning	simply	highlight	the	distinction	between	content	and	object.	Building	on	both Brentano	and	Bolzano,	Husserl	defended	the	thesis	in	Husserl	(1991a/1999)	that	there are	objectless	presentations	(like	the	presentation	of	the	god	Jupiter,	or	of	a	golden mountain).	Intentionality	in	this	context	is	a	property	of	the	content	of	meaning (Meinen)	something,	and	is	not	conceived	as	a	relation	at	all.	As	Husserl	puts	it	in	the Logical	Investigations,	I	do	not	present	Jupiter	differently	than	I	present	Bismarck:	since intentionality	is	a	property	of	the	content	of	meaning	something,	both	acts	are intentional	in	the	same	sense.	As	a	consequence	of	this	view,	it	seems	that	the	nonexistence	of	the	god	Jupiter	has	nothing	to	do	with	intentionality.	Generalizing	this consequence	would	lead	to	the	view	that	acts	of	meaning	are	quite	distinct	in	kind	from acts	of	reference. Another	important	component	of	Husserl's	early	account	of	intentionality,	which is	absent	from	Brentano's	enhanced	theory,	is	that	meaning	acts	instantiate	ideal species.	This	relationship	of	instantiation	is	what	allows	for	the	objectivity	of	meaning. Around	1908,	Husserl's	views	on	the	theory	of	meaning	changed	considerably.	In his	lectures	on	this	topic	(Husserl	1986),	he	introduces	the	distinction	between	"phansic meaning"	[phansische	Bedeutung],	which	is	the	Bedeutung	of	meaning	acts (Meinungsakte)	in	terms	of	species,	and	the	"ontic"	or	"phenomenological"	meaning, which	is	"the	intentional	object	as	meant."	This	distinction	seems	to	remediate	to	the consequences	of	the	earlier	theory	exposed	above.	In	acts	of	meaning	(Meinen), expressed	for	instance	by	my	utterances	about	Jupiter,	there	is	a	Bedeutung	which	is instantiated	in	my	act;	but	prior	to	this	there	is	an	ontic	correlate	of	the	act,	the "thought-of	Jupiter",	which	is	the	object-as-intended.	Husserl	sometimes	calls	this	type of	entity	a	"noematic	sense,"	and	later,	in	1913,	simply	the	"noema." If	Husserl's	theory	of	intentionality	in	the	Logical	Investigations	has	often	been described	as	an	adverbial	theory,	for	its	rejection	of	the	relational	interpretation	of intentionality	(wherein	there	are	objectless	presentations)	and	its	characterization	of intentionality	as	a	property	of	acts	of	meaning	(Meinen),	the	noematic	theory	of	the	Ideas seems	to	bring	back	a	relational	conception	of	intentionality,	independently	of	whether we	conceive	of	the	noema	as	an	object	from	a	perspective	(Drummond	1990)	or	as	some kind	of	Fregean	sense	(Føllesdal	1969;	Smith	and	MacIntyre	1982).	In	either	case, 31 however,	the	noema	plays	the	role	of	the	correlate	in	a	sense	which	is	reminiscent	of Brentano's	intentional	correlates	in	the	enhanced	theory. Consciousness Besides	the	intentional	thesis,	the	second	most	important	thesis	in	Brentano's psychology	is	based	on	a	further	constitutive	characteristic	of	mental	phenomena, namely	the	fact	that	only	mental	phenomena	are	innerly	perceived	(Brentano 1874/2015:	118f/95f). The	gist	of	this	idea	is	clearly	expressed	in	the	Psychology: "the	presentation	of	the	sound	and	the	presentation	of	the	presentation	of	the sound	form	a	single	mental	phenomenon,	it	is	only	by	considering	it	in	its relation	to	two	different	objects,	one	of	which	is	a	physical	phenomenon	and the	other	a	mental	phenomenon,	that	we	divide	it	conceptually	into	two presentations.	In	the	same	mental	phenomenon	in	which	the	sound	is present	to	our	minds	we	simultaneously	apprehend	the	mental	phenomenon itself." (Brentano	1874/2015:	167/132). The	"apprehension"	(Erfassen)	of	the	mental	phenomenon	itself	is	what	Brentano	calls consciousness	or	inner	consciousness.	As	the	sound	is	co-present	(with	the	mental phenomenon	itself)	in	our	apprehension,	consciousness	implies	intentionality,	which means	that	there	is	no	consciousness	of	an	act	which	is	not	already	directed	towards	an object.	But	since	intentionality	and	consciousness	are	both	essential	features	of	mental acts,	the	implication	works	the	other	way	around	as	well:	there	is	no	intentional directedness	of	an	act	which	is	not	itself	conscious.	This	also	explains	Brentano's particular	position	on	the	unconscious:	since,	in	our	experience,	there	are	no	intentional acts	which	are	not	conscious,	and	since	there	is	no	consciousness	of	an	act	which	is	not already	intentional,	then	there	is	no	"unconscious	consciousness,"	although	the	idea	of an	non-conscious	intentional	act	involves	no	contradiction.	Nevertheless,	intentionality and	consciousness	are	co-extensive. Brentano's	"apprehension"	is	double:	in	every	mental	phenomenon,	we apprehend	the	object	of	the	mental	phenomenon	and,	incidentally	(en	parergo)	the mental	phenomenon	itself.	It	would	be	wrong,	however,	to	consider	the	apprehension	as an	element	distinct	from	the	mental	phenomenon	itself:	in	presenting	the	table,	the primary	object	of	my	act	is	the	table,	and	the	secondary	object	is	the	presenting	itself. An	objection	that	might	be	raised	to	such	a	theory	is	that	it	may	involve	an infinite	regress.	If	my	presentation	of	the	sound	is	conscious	because	of	my	presentation 32 of	the	presentation	of	the	sound,	what	makes	the	presentation	of	the	presentation	of	the sound	itself	conscious?	Brentano	himself	reacted	to	this	objection	by	underlining	the fact	that	a)	both	belong	to	one	single	and	indivisible	mental	act,	and	that	b)	through	its existence,	the	presentation	of	the	sound	'inwardly	contributes'	to	the	existence	of	the presentation	of	the	presentation	of	the	sound	(Brentano	1874/2015:	167/132). Therefore	the	regress	does	not	even	begin,	since	the	presentation	of	the	sound	is "intertwined"	(verwoben)	with	the	presentation	of	its	presentation.	And	since	the existence	of	the	former	contributes	to	the	existence	of	the	latter	(but	not	the	other	way around),	the	objection,	according	to	which	the	latter	makes	the	former	conscious,	does not	seem	to	apply. The	intimate	intertwining	between	the	presentation	of	the	sound	and	the presentation	of	that	presentation	evoked	by	Brentano	is	an	essential	part	of	his conception	of	the	unity	of	consciousness	and	of	the	various	mereological	dependency relations	among	parts	of	the	mental.	The	relationship	between	the	presentation	of	the sound	and	the	presentation	of	the	presentation	of	the	sound	is	a	one-sided	distinctional separability:	you	may	have,	theoretically	or	"distinctionally,"	a	presentation	of	the	sound without	a	presentation	of	the	presentation	of	the	sound,	at	least	insofar	as	this	notion does	not	involve	a	contradiction.	But	the	reverse	is	not	the	case.	Here,	"distinctional" means	that	the	one-sided	separability	is	not	found	in	the	acts	themselves,	but	in	our description	of	them.	In	contrast,	real	one-sided	detachability	is	involved	in	the	relation between	a	presentation	of	the	sound	and	a	judgment	acknowledging	the	existence	of	the sound	or	a	feeling	of	pleasure	on	hearing	the	sound.	You	may	have	a	presentation	of	the sound	without	feeling	pleasure	about	the	sound,	but	you	cannot	take	pleasure	in	the sound	without	presenting	it.	These	different	dependence	relations	between	parts	of	the mental	are	the	basis	of	what	Brentano	describes	as	the	"unity	of	consciousness,"	i.e.,	the fact	"that	all	mental	phenomena	which	occur	within	us	simultaneously	such	as	seeing and	hearing,	thinking,	judging	and	reasoning,	loving	and	hating,	desiring	and	shunning, etc.,	no	matter	how	different	they	may	be,	all	belong	to	one	unitary	reality	only	if	they are	inwardly	perceived	as	existing	together"	(1874/2015:	126/101). In	an	influential	objection	to	Brentano's	account	of	consciousness,	Husserl	points out	that	it	seems	implausible	to	say	that	when	I	see	a	house,	what	I	am	aware	of	is	my presentation	of	sensory	contents	(Husserl	1901a,	237).	To	be	sure,	sensory	contents	are experienced,	but	they	are	present	to	consciousness	only	to	the	extent	that	they	serve	as a	vehicle	for	the	perception	of	objects,	not	as	objects	of	inner	perception.	This	is	in	line 33 with	Husserl's	critique	of	Brentano's	concept	of	intentionality	according	to	which sensations	are	not	intentional,	since	they	do	not	provide	us	with	objects	(see	above). This	does	not	mean,	however,	that	Husserl	considers	sensory	contents	not	to	be	part	of consciousness:	rather,	the	idea	is	that	sensory	contents	are	experienced	as	intrinsically subjective,	and	in	fact	not	as	'contents'	at	all,	but	as	phenomenological	and	real	(reelle) constituents	of	experiences. It	must	be	said,	however,	that	Husserl's	objection	is	not	completely	fair	to Brentano's	account,	as	Brentano	never	argued	that	the	inner	perception	of	a	mental phenomenon	(say	a	presenting)	takes	this	presenting	as	an	object	in	the	same	sense	as the	presentation	itself	has	an	object.	Calling	them	'primary'	and	'secondary'	objects	is definitively	a	suboptimal	choice.	Nevertheless,	in	this	context	Husserl's	point	has	the merit	of	forcefully	stressing	this	difference:	the	subjective	constituents	of	experience	do not	stand	before	us	as	objects. Another	interesting	feature	of	Husserl's	concept	of	consciousness	that	contrasts with	Brentano's	account	is	the	distinction	between	the	epistemic	authority	of	inner perception	and	its	adequateness.	Following	Brentano,	Husserl	holds	that	only	inner perception	is	evident	and	can	thereby	provide	the	grounds	for	secure	knowledge.	Outer perception,	in	contrast,	can	only	give	us	probable	knowledge.	Brentano	sees	the epistemic	authority	of	inner	perception	as	constitutive	of	consciousness:	on	his	view, since	only	mental	phenomena	are	given	as	they	are,	I	am	only	conscious	of	(i.e.,	I	can innerly	perceive	only)	mental	phenomena,	and	not,	e.g.,	of	physical	happenings	in	my body,	houses,	or	chairs.	An	important	consequence	of	this	account	is	that	I	am	conscious only	of	whatever	mental	phenomenon	is	occurring	now:	there	is	no	proper consciousness	of	a	temporally	extended	object,	temporally	extended	mental	processes, or	simply	past	experiences.	For	Husserl,	in	contrast,	the	alleged	epistemic	authority	of inner	perception	constrains	our	analyses	of	conscious	experiences	far	too	much, requiring	us	to	discard	a	huge	variety	of	experiences	which	are	obviously	conscious	in	a phenomenologically	relevant	sense,	such	as	hearing	a	song,	thinking	about	a mathematical	problem,	remembering	one's	child's	first	footsteps,	seeing	a	train	pass	by, enjoying	a	cigar,	feeling	the	urgent	need	to	sneeze,	etc.	These	experiences,	Husserl contends,	do	not	have	the	same	epistemic	authority	as	those	involving	a	mental phenomenon	that	is	occurring	now,	but	they	still	display	some	adequacy	to	what	is	given in	them,	what	he	also	calls	their	"presentness." 34 There	are	different	ways	of	spelling	out	what	"presentness"	means.	Based	on	the examples	mentioned	above,	one	practical	way	to	illustrate	this	idea	is	the	description	of time-consciousness.	On	Brentano's	account,	there	is	no	time-consciousness	properly speaking,	but	rather	a	continuum	of	mental	phenomena	related	to	one	another	by "originary	association."	This	does	not	belong	as	such	to	the	realm	of	the	mental,	but	is	an innate	associative	feature	which	relates	the	contents	of	outer	perception	at	different times	to	each	other,	and	which	gives	us	the	impression	that	we	perceive	a	motion,	a figure,	or	any	temporally	extended	entity.	On	this	account,	time-consciousness	is	only consciousness	at	a	time,	but	thanks	to	originary	association,	we	"retain"	past	contents	at a	given	time.	This	is	the	basic	idea	behind	Brentano's	account	of	time-consciousness.71 Husserl's	account	of	time-consciousness	(Husserl	1966/1991)	preserves	the	gist of	Brentano's	account	–	its	retentional	structure	– but	also	adds	an	idea	introduced	in Stern	(1897/2005),	namely	that	"mental	events	that	play	themselves	out	within	a certain	stretch	of	time	can	under	circumstances	form	a	unified	and	complex	act	of consciousness	regardless	of	the	non-simultaneity	of	individual	parts.	That	stretch	of time	over	which	such	a	mental	act	can	be	extended	I	call	its	presence	time	(PräsenzZeit)"	(Stern	1897/2005,	pp.	326-7/p.	315).	Husserl's	analysis	of	time-consciousness combines	Brentano's	and	Stern's	accounts	in	the	following	way:	while	hearing	c	now	(at t3)	after	having	heard	b	at	t1	and	a	at	t0,	I	have	i)	a	primal	impression	(Urimpression)	of c	accompanied	by	ii)	retention	of	b	and	a	and	iii)	protention	of	what	I	am	about	to	hear. The	three	elements	(i)	to	(iii)	are	as	such	merely	a	refinement	of	Brentano's	retentional model.	The	difference	with	Brentano's	account	is	that	the	structure	depicted	by	(i)	to (iii)	is	itself	not	a	"now-point,"	as	Brentano	has	it,	but	should	be	considered	itself	as	a flow,	along	the	lines	of	Stern's	account:	"the	retention	that	exists	'together'	with	the consciousness	of	the	now	is	not	'now,'	is	not	simultaneous	with	the	now,	and	it	would make	no	sense	to	say	that	it	is"	(Husserl	1962/1991:	333/345-6).	Husserl's	presentness therefore	proposes	an	account	of	the	unity	of	time-consciousness:	namely,	of	the intuitively	plausible	idea	that	our	experience	of	succession	is	a	unitary	(and	fully conscious)	phenomenon,	and	not	a	succession	of	separate	experiences.	This	idea	would go	on	to	play	a	central	role	in	his	later	transcendental	phenomenology. Emotions	and	values 71 See Fréchette (2017a) for a more detailed account of the different features of this account. 35 Brentano	distinguishes	between	three	classes	of	mental	phenomena:	presentations, judgments,	and	acts	of	love	and	hate.	The	last	class	encompasses	emotions,	volitions, desires,	and	feelings.	Emotions	(but	this	also	applies	by	extension	to	the	other phenomena	in	this	class),	like	judgments,	have	two	polarly	opposed	types:	either	we love	or	we	hate	Wiener	Melange,	in	a	manner	that	is	similar	to	the	way	in	which	we either	acknowledge	or	reject	something's	existence.	The	polarly	opposed	types	of judging	(acknowledging/rejecting)	and	emoting	(loving/hating)	are	similar	because	in both	cases,	correctness	resp.	incorrectness	are	constitutive	of	the	definition	of	what	is true	(correct	acknowledgement)	and	what	is	good	(correct	love).	This	makes	Brentano's account	of	emotions	an	evaluative	account	of	the	following	sort:	i)	emotions	are	mental acts	which	constitutively	involve	a	valuing	of	their	intentional	object	(as	good	or	bad),	ii) the	value	of	an	emotion	is	fixed	by	its	correctness	or	incorrectness,	and	iii)	the correctness	of	an	emotion	is	nothing	but	its	'fittingness'	with	respect	to	the	object intended	as	valuable.	My	love	of	coffee	is	a	valuing,	a	position	taking,	a	positive	emotion towards	coffee:	my	emotion	is	valuable	iff	it	is	correct	to	love	coffee	and	it	is	correct	to love	coffee	iff	the	loving	fits	the	coffee	(or	in	other	words:	iff	coffee	is	worthy	of	love).72 How	do	we	come	to	know	that	coffee,	or	anything,	is	worthy	of	love?	Before answering	this	question,	let	us	return	to	principle	(e). As	mentioned	above,	Brentano seems	to	have	defended	two	basic	theories	of	the	nature	of	correctness.	The	first	theory fully	embraces	feature	(iii):	it	describes	correctness	as	a	genuine	relation,	the	relation	of fitting	(Angemessenheit).	In	some	places,	Brentano	holds	that	the	relationship	involves	a deontic	norm	(for	my	love	of	coffee	to	be	is	for	my	love	of	coffee	to	be	as	it	ought	to be73);	but	in	most	texts,	he	maintains	that	it	holds	with	an	object	as	valuable:	"in	cases where	our	behaviour	(Verhalten)	is	correct	our	emotion	corresponds	to	the	object,	is	in harmony	with	its	value,	and	that,	on	the	other	hand,	in	cases	where	our	behaviour	is wrong	(verkehrt)	it	is	opposed	(widerspreche)	to	its	object,	is	in	a	relation	of	disharmony with	its	value"	(Brentano	1930/1966:	25/14-5,	translation	modified). The	second,	later	theory	of	the	nature	of	correctness	proposes	an	important	amendment to	feature	(iii),	namely	(iiia):	that	the	correctness	of	an	emotion	is	not	a	relation	of	actual 72 Brentano (1889/1902, pp. 75-7/pp. 69-71; p. 17/pp. 11-2; 1930/1966, p. 25/pp. 14-5; 1959, p. 169; 1968, p. 141). 73 See Mulligan (forthcoming) for this specific account of fittingness exposed by Brentano in 1906. See also Fréchette (2015) on Kraus' interpretation of this account. 36 fitting,	but	rather	it	is	simply	experienced	as	such,	it	manifests	itself	as	correct:74	"the concept	of	correctness	is	made	manifest	to	us	in	precisely	the	way	in	which	other concepts	are	made	manifest	to	us.	We	consider	a	multiplicity	of	things	each	of	which exemplifies	the	concept	and	we	direct	our	attention	upon	what	these	things	have	in common.	Whenever	I	perceive	that	I	judge	with	evidence	I	am	aware	of	myself	as someone	who	is	judging	correctly....	And	now,	so	far	as	the	correctness	of	our	emotive attitudes	is	concerned,	we	find	that	the	situation	is	completely	analogous....	One	can never	find	the	criterion	of	correctness	in	an	adaequatio	rei	et	intellectus	vel	amoris:	it	can be	found	only	in	those	attitudes	which	we	know	with	immediate	evidence	to	be correct."75 Like	Marty	and	Meinong,	Husserl	accepted	all	the	components	of	Brentano's	account	of emotions	and	values	already	mentioned	but	rearranges	them	in	a	significantly	different way,	amending	feature	(iii)	in	(iiib):	the	correctness	of	an	emotion	is	grounded	in	a	state of	value	(Wertverhalt).	This	amended	feature	was	also	the	one	preferred	by	Marty,	but also	by	many	early	realist	phenomenologists	such	as	Reinach	and	Daubert.	In	analogy with	states	of	affairs	which	are	the	correctness-makers	of	true	judgments,	states	of	value are	'value-makers'	of	correct	emotings.76 Psychologism	and	Anti-Psychologism In	considering	the	specificity	of	Husserl's	phenomenology	with	respect	to	Brentano's philosophical	programme	in	general,	and	its	contrast	with	Brentano's	five	principles described	above	in	particular,	the	importance	of	Husserl's	strong	realism	regarding	the objects	of	intentional	acts	–	exemplified	here	in	his	account	of	value	–	should	not	be underestimated.	In	order	to	capture	more	precisely	this	specificity,	here	we	will	look	at his	critique	of	psychologism	in	the	Logical	Investigations.	This	critique	largely	shaped discussion	on	phenomenology	in	the	school	of	Brentano	at	the	beginning	of	the 20th	century.	It	was	also	determinant	in	the	later	positioning	of	phenomenology	as	a 74 Chisholm (1986, p. 53) uses precisely Brentano's late theory to show that Brentano's account of emotion is an account of fitting attitudes. We might indeed reword (iiia) in order to keep the fitting relation, for instance by saying that an emotion is correct iff "it is appropriate, or fitting, for me to feel this strong pro-attitude toward this experience" (see also Feldman and Feldman 2015, and similarly Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004). Mulligan (forthcoming) makes a convincing case that attributing a fitting attitude theory to the late Brentano is "wrong or highly misleading." The main reason is that Brentano's late reism aims to reject the relational conception of intentionality. Since emotions are intentional acts, it is reasonable to think that their correctness should not be considered in relational terms. 75 Letter from Brentano to Kraus (1916), quoted in Chisholm (1966, pp. 399-400) 76 See Husserl (1988). On Husserl and normative grounding, see Mulligan (forthcoming-b). 37 "pure	philosophy,"	along	with	Neo-Kantianism	and	Lebensphilosophie,	and	in	opposition to	the	newly	emerging	experimental	psychology. As	mentioned	earlier	(section	1),	it	was	initially	his	exchange	with	Frege,	but	also Frege's	review	of	his	Philosophy	of	Arithmetics,	which	convinced	Husserl	of	the shortcomings	of	his	Brentanian	account	of	arithmetics.	In	a	nutshell,	Frege	argued	that Husserl's	lack	of	a	distinction	between	concept	and	object	made	it	impossible	for	him	to distinguish	between	the	subjective	and	the	objective,	and	between	the	marks	of	an object	and	the	properties	of	a	concept.	If	numbers	are	subjective	contents	of presentation,	then	Husserl's	Brentanian	account	of	arithmetics	would	fail	to	give	a proper	account	of	identity,	which	challenges	not	only	the	objectivity	of	arithmetic,	but also	the	idea	that	the	distinction	between	sense	and	reference	is	objective. In	1928,	Husserl	conceded	to	his	student	Boyce-Gibson	that	Frege's	critique	"hit the	nail	on	the	head,"77	which	recalls	the	quote	from	Goethe	at	the	beginning	of	the Prolegomena.	Another	important	influence	in	Husserl's	early	critique	of	psychologism	is to	be	found	in	Bolzano,	who	Husserl	credits	for	showing	him	the	importance	of	objective ideas	(Vorstellungen	an	sich)	and	propositions	in	themselves	(Sätze	an	sich)	for	the development	of	a	pure	logic	(Husserl	2002:	298-99). Lotze	was	also	an	important influence	on	the	development	of	Husserl's	pure	logic	(see	Husserl	1979,	p.	156). Husserl's	critique	of	logic	as	a	practical	and	normative	discipline	(a	sub-discipline of	psychology)	in	the	Prolegomena	is	based	on	the	idea	that	normative	disciplines	are	in any	case	at	least	partly	grounded	in	theoretical	disciplines:	"Every	normative proposition	of,	e.g.,	the	form	'An	A	should	be	B'	implies	the	theoretical	proposition	'Only an	A	which	is	B	has	the	properties	C',	in	which	'C'	serves	to	indicate	the	constitutive content	of	the	standard-setting	predicate	'good'	(e.g.,	pleasure,	knowledge,	...)	The	new proposition	is	purely	theoretical:	it	contains	no	trace	of	the	thought	of	normativity" (Husserl	1900/2001a:	48/38). The	Prolegomena	also	offers	a	detailed	critique	of	the	consequences	of psychologism	in	logic,	most	notably	on	the	problematic	interpretation	of	logical principles	(like	the	law	of	non-contradiction)	and	of	the	laws	of	syllogistics	in psychological	terms,	as	well	as	the	relativism	implied	by	psychologism.	The	book	had	a central	influence	on	the	development	of	anti-psychologism	in	German	philosophy 77 See Spiegelberg (1971, p. 66) and (1982, p. 151). A similar affirmation is reported in Føllesdal (1982, p. 53) who mentions a discussion he had with Ingarden: "He [Roman Ingarden] told me that he once asked Husserl whether Frege had influenced him, and Husserl answered 'Freges Bedeutung war entscheidend'." 38 between	1901	and	1920,	with	reactions	from	Schlick	to	the	Neo-Kantians	Kroner, Windelband,	and	Rickert. In	the	school	of	Brentano,	Husserl's	critique	of	psychologism	was	received	with mitigated	feelings.	In	1904,	Meinong	openly	agreed	with	Husserl	in	his	Theory	of	Objects: "the	entire	tenor	of	the	Logical	Investigations,	as	well	as	many	of	the	particular statements	that	are	contained	in	it,	convinces	one	that,	despite	certain	differences	in detail	(at	present	unavoidable),	the	author's	goal	is	the	same	as	our	own"	(Meinong 1904/	1960:	22/94).	Some	years	later,	in	Functions	and	Products	(Funktionen	und Gebilde),	Twardowski	(1914/1999a)	also	followed	Husserl's	critique	of	psychologism	in his	theory	of	Gebilde,	as	did	Husserl's	own	mentor	in	Halle,	Carl	Stumpf,	in Erscheinungen	und	psychische	Funktionen	(1907). Brentano	himself	remained	highly	critical	of	Husserl's	charge	against psychologism,	seeing	himself	as	the	target	of	unjust	accusations.	The	main	motivation for	Brentano's	reaction	lay	in	Husserl's	arguments	against	the	conception	of	logic	as	a technique	(Kunstlehre),	as	a	practical	subdiscipline	of	psychology,	which	is	the	account of	logic	that	Brentano	defended	in	his	lectures.	Husserl	corroborated	this	reaction	in	his reminiscences	of	Brentano,	in	which	he	recalls	that	despite	many	efforts,	he	and Brentano	"did	not	reach	any	agreement	[on	Husserl's	former	fight	against psychologism]"	(Husserl	1919/1976,	p.	166/p.	54).	But	the	charge	and	its	reception	by Brentano,	and	thereby	the	disagreement	between	Brentano	and	Husserl	on psychologism,	is	based	on	a	double	misunderstanding. On	the	one	hand,	Brentano	did	not	see	the	motivation	(or	did	not	acknowledge the	legitimacy)	of	Husserl's	attempt	to	ground	the	laws	of	logic	in	a	discipline	of mathematical	form	(Husserl	1900/2001a:	222/138-140),	what	Husserl	calls,	in reference	to	his	colleague	from	Halle	Cantor,	the	pure	theory	of	multiplicities	(reine Mannigfaltigkeitslehre).	This	is	similar	to	the	relationship	of	Leibniz's	combinatorics	to the	foundation	of	arithmetics,	which	would	lead	to	the	foundation	of	pure	logic	and	with it	to	a	unified	theory	of	science	(Wissenschaftslehre)	inspired	by	Bolzano,	encompassing pure	grammar	(i.e.,	the	theory	of	the	a	priori	forms	of	meaning	and	the	laws	of	logical validity,	which	allows	for	a	formal	ontology	–	i.e.,	a	science	of	objects	in	general),	and pure	theory	of	probabilities.	In	Brentano's	view	in	1905,	such	a	strategy	inevitably	leads to	a	theory	of	"objects	of	thought	and	their	combinations"	(Husserl	1994,	p.	31).	He himself	defended	this	theory	at	some	point	in	his	career	(see	above:	the	enhanced theory),	but	abandoned	it	in	his	reism	as	implausible. 39 On	the	other	hand,	Husserl	did	not	really	do	justice	to	Brentano's	descriptive psychology,	which	he	associated	in	many	places	to	psychology	as	a	science	of	facts,	even accusing	Brentano	in	this	respect	of	being	a	naturalist	(Husserl	1962/1977,	p.	37/p.	26). To	the	contrary,	it	is	clear	that	the	laws	of	Brentano's	descriptive	psychology	are	a	priori laws,	and	that	in	his	account	descriptive	psychology	is	to	serve	as	a	basis	for	a characteristica	universalis	(Brentano	1895:	34).	In	this	respect,	Husserl's phenomenology	and	Brentano's	descriptive	psychology	are	equally	anti-psychologistic. The	only	difference	in	their	approach	lies	in	Husserl's	advocacy	of	a	Platonistic	strategy in	the	Logical	Investigations,	which	Brentano	considered	unnecessary,	granted	the distinction	between	causal	laws	(e.g.,	of	genetic	psychology)	and	essential	laws	(e.g.,	of descriptive	psychology).78 78 This chapter has been written with the support of the Austrian Science Foundation (FWF), Project number P27215. Thanks to the editor John Shand for many helpful remarks, to Johannes L. Brandl and Kevin Mulligan for written comments on a previous version, and to Paul Reeve for linguistic revision. 40 Bibliography Ahlman,	E.	(1926),	Das	normative	Moment	im	Bedeutungsbegriff,	Helsingfors,	Druckerei	der	Finnischen Literatur	Gesellschaft. Anonymous	(1894),	„Der	Fall	Brentano",Die	Grenzboten,	53,	p.	477	and	532-535. Anonymous	(1894a),	„Zum	Falle	Brentano",	Das	Vaterland,	13.	Dezember	1894,	pp.	1-2 Anonymous	(1895),	„Der	Fall	Brentano",	in	Der	österreichische	Protestant,	vol.	20,	pp.	26-26	and	67-70. Baumgartner,	W.	(2003)	„Franz	Brentano:	‚Grossvater	der	Phänomenologie'"	Studia	Phaenomenologica	3: 15-60. Baumgartner, W. (2013) "Franz Brentano's Mereology", in Fisette & Fréchette (eds), Themes from Brentano,	Amsterdam:	Rodopi:	227-245. Bergman,	H.	(1946),	"Briefe	Franz	Brentanos	an	Hugo	Bergman",	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological Research,	7:	83-158. Bolzano,	B.	(1837)	Wissenschaftslehre	(4	vols).	Sulzbach:	Seidelsche	Buchhandlung.	English	translation (2014)	Theory	of	Science	(4	vols).	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Brandl,	J.	(2014),	"Brentano's	Theory	of	Judgment",	in	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/brentano-judgement/ Brandl,	J.	(2017),	"Was	Brentano	an	Early	Deflationist	about	Truth?",	The	Monist,	volume	100,	p.	1-14. Brandl,	J.	(forthcoming)	"Brentano's	Renewal	of	Philosophy:	A	Double-Edged	Sword"	in	Brentano	Studien 15. Brentano,	C.	(1854)	Nachgelassene	religiöse	Schriften,	Munich:	literatisch-artistische	Anstalt. Brentano, F. (1862/1975) Von den	mannigfachen Bedeutungen des Seienden nach Aristoteles. Freiburg: Herdersche	Verlagshandlung.	English	translation	(1975),	On	the	Several	Senses	of	Being	in	Aristotle. Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press. Brentano,	F.	(1866)	Ad	Disputationem	Qua	Theses	Gratiosi	Philosophorum	Ordinis	Consensu	Et	Auctoritate Pro	Impetranda	Venia	Docendi	in	Alma	Universitate	Julio-Maximiliana	Defendet.	Aschaffenburg: Schniper. Brentano,	F.	(1867/1977a)	Die	Psychologie	des	Aristoteles.	Mainz:	Kirchheim.	English	translation	(1977a) The	Psychology	of	Aristotle.	Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press. Brentano,	F.	(1867a)	"Geschichte	der	kirchlichen	Wissenschaften.	Das	Mittelalter",	in	J.A.	Möhler	(ed), Kirchengeschichte,	Volume	2,	Regensburg:	Manz:	526-584. Brentano,	F.	(1874/2015),	Psychologie	vom	empirischen	Standpunkte,	Leipzig:	Duncker	&	Humblot.	English translation	(2015)	Psychology	from	an	empirical	Standpoint.	London:	Routledge. Brentano,	F.	(1889),	Vom	Ursprung	sittlicher	Erkenntnis.	Leipzig:	Duncker	&	Humblot.	English	translation (1902),	The	origin	of	the	knowledge	of	right	and	wrong.	Westminster:	Constable	&	Co. Brentano,	F.	(1895),	Meine	letzten	Wünsche	für	Österreich,	Stuttgart:	Cotta. Brentano,	F.	(1925),	Versuch	über	die	Erkenntnis.	Leipzig:	Meiner. Brentano,	Franz	(1926/1988)	Die	Vier	Phasen	der	Philosophie.	Leipzig:	Meiner.	English	translation	(1988) The	Four	Phases	of	Philosophy.	Amsterdam:	Rodopi. Brentano,	F.	(1929),	Über	die	Zukunft	der	Philosophie,	Leipzig:	Meiner. Brentano,	F.	(1930/1966).	Wahrheit	und	Evidenz.	Felix	Meiner.	English	Translation:	(1966)	The	True	and the	Evident.	London:	Routledge	and	Kegan	Paul. Brentano,	F.	(1952/1973).	Grundlegung	und	Aufbau	der	Ethik.	Francke.	English	translation	(1973)	The Foundation	and	Construction	of	Ethics.	London:	Routledge. Brentano,	F.	(1959).	Grundzüge	der	Ästhetik.	Francke. Brentano,	F.	(1969)	„Einige	Bemerkungen	über	die	Frage:	Ist	es	zeitgemäss,	die	Unfehlbarkeit	des	Papstes zu	definieren",	in	T.	Freudenberger	(ed.),	Die	Universität	Würzburg	und	das	erste	vatikanische Konzil.	Ein	Beitrag	zur	Kirchenund	Geistesgeschichte	des	19.	Jahrhunderts.	Neustadt:	Degener	&	Co. 407-437. Brentano, F. (1982) Deskriptive Psychologie, Hamburg: Meiner. English Translation (1995) Descriptive Psychology.	London:	Routledge. Brentano,	F.	(1987)	Geschichte	der	Philosophie	der	Neuzeit.	Hamburg:	Meiner. Brentano,	F.	(2016)	"Die	Gesetze	der	Wechselwirkung	der	Naturkräfte	und	ihre	Bedeutung	für	die Metaphysik" Brentano,	F.	(forthcoming),	Deskriptive	Psychologie	und	Beschreibende	Phänomenologie.	Vorlesungen 1887/88	und	1888/89.	Dordrecht:	Springer. Carnap,	R.	(1931)	„Überwindung	der	Metaphysik	durch	logische	Analyse	der	Sprache",	Erkenntnis,	vol.	2: 219-241. Carr,	D.	(2014),	Experience	and	History.	Phenomenological	Perspectives	on	the	Historical	World.	Oxford: Oxford	University	Press. Cohen,	J.	and	D.	Moran	(2012),	The	Husserl	Dictionary.	London:	Continuum. 41 Chisholm,	R.	(1957)	Perceiving.	Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press. Chisholm,	R.	(ed)	(1960)	Realism	and	the	Background	of	Phenomenology,	New	York:	Glencoe. Chisholm,	R.	(1966)	„Brentano's	Theory	of	Correct	and	Incorrect	Emotion".	Revue	Internationale	de Philsoophie	20:	395-415. Chisholm,	R.	(1967)	'Intentionality'	in	Edwards,	P.	(ed),	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy.	London:	Macmillan. Chisholm,	R.	(1986)	Brentano	and	Intrinsic	Value.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press. Chrudzimski,	A.	(2004)	Brentanos	Ontologie.	Dordrecht:	Springer. Chrudzimski,	A.	&	B.	Smith	(2004),	„Brentano's	Ontology.	From	Conceptualism	to	Reism",	in	D.	Jacquette (ed),	Cambridge	Companion	to	Brentano.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press. Clausius,	R.	(1865)	"Über	verschiedene	für	die	Anwendung	bequeme	Formen	der	Hauptgleichungen	der mechanischen	Wärmetheorie",	Annalen	der	Physik,	Bd.	123:	353–400. Clemens,	F.J.	(1856)	De	scholasticorum	sentential	philosophiam	esse	theologiae	ancillam	commentatio, Münster:	Akademischer	Verlag	Aschendorff. Clemens,	F.J.	(1859)	„Unser	Standpunkt	in	der	Philosophie."	Der	Katholik	39	(nova	seria	1):	9-23;	129-154. Dretske,	F.	(1969),	Seeing	and	Knowing,	Chicago:	Chicago	University	Press. Drummond,	J.	(1990)	Husserlian	Intentionality	and	Non-Foundational	Realism.	Noema	and	Object. Dordrecht:	Kluwer. Du	Bois-Reymond,	E.	(1872/1874)	Über	die	Grenzen	des	Naturerkennens,	Leipzig:	Veit.	English	translation (1874),	"The	Limits	of	Our	Knowledge	of	Nature",	Popular	Science	Monthly,	vol.	5,	17-32. Dummett,	M	(1988)	Ursprünge	der	analytischen	Philosophie.	Frankfurt:	Suhrkamp.	Revised	and	published in	English	as	(1993)	Origins	of	Analytical	Philosophy.	London:	Duckworth. Ewing,	A.C.	(1947)	The	Definition	of	Good.	New	York:	MacMillan. Falckenberg,	R.	(1901).	H.	Lotze.	Das	Leben	und	die	Entstehung	der	Schriften	nach	den	Briefen.	Stuttgart: Frommanns. Feldman,	R.	and	F.	Feldman	(2015)	"Roderick	Chisholm"	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chisholm/ Fels	H.	(1926)	«	Franz	Brentanos	religiöse	Krise	»,	Unitas.	Monatsschrift	des	Verbandes	der wissenschaftlichen	katholischen	Studientenvereine	Unitas	67:	161-163. Fisette,	D.	and	G.	Fréchette	(eds),	À	l'école	de	Brentano.	De	Würzburg	à	Vienne,	Paris:	Vrin. Føllesdal,	D.	(1969),	"Husserl's	Notion	of	Noema",	Journal	of	Philosophy,	66,	680-687. Føllesdal,	D.	(1982),	„"Husserl's	Conversion	from	Psychologism	and	the	Vorstellung-MeaningReference Distinction:	Two	Separate	Issues",	in	Dreyfus,	H.L.	(Hrsg.)	Husserl,	Intentionality	and	Cognitive Science,	Cambridge,	MIT	Press,	1982. Fréchette,	G.	(2012)	«	Franz	Brentano	in	Würzburg:	Die	Anfänge	der	deskriptiven	Psychologie	»,	in Historische	Analysen	theoretischer	und	empirischer	Psychologie	(A.	Stock,	H.-P.	Brauns	et	U.	Wolfradt Hrsg.),	Frankfurt,	Peter	Lang,	2012,	S.	91-106. Fréchette,	G.	(2013),	"Brentano's	Thesis	(revisited)"	in	D.	Fisette	and	G.	Fréchette	(eds.),	Themes	from Brentano.	Amsterdam:	Rodopi.	92-119. Fréchette,	G.	(2013a),	"Searching	for	the	Self:	Early	Phenomenological	Accounts	of	Self-Consciousness from	Lotze	to	Scheler",	International	Journal	of	Philosophical	Studies,	vol.	21	no.	5:	654-679. Fréchette,	G	(2015)	„Le	moment	normatif	dans	la	philosophie	austro-allemande"	Philosophiques	42:	375384. Fréchette,	G.	(2015a),	„Stumpf	on	Abstraction",	in	D.	Fisette	&	R.	Martinelli	(eds.)	Philosophy	from	an Empirical	Standpoint:	Essays	on	Carl	Stumpf.	Leiden:	Brill:	263-292. Fréchette,	G.	(2016a),	"Brentano	on	Sensory	Intentionality",	in	Studia	Philosophica,	75:	33-49. Fréchette,	G.	(2017a)	«	Brentano	on	Time-Consciousness	»,	in	U.	Kriegel	(ed.),	Routledge	Companion	to	the School	of	Brentano,	London:	Routledge:	75-86. Fréchette,	G.	(forthcoming-a),	„Einführung",	in	Brentano,	F	Aristoteles	und	seine	Weltanschauung, Sämtliche	Schriften	Band	5,	Berlin	De	Gruyter. Fréchette,	G.	(forthcoming-b),	„Marty	on	Abstraction",	in	Fréchette,	G.	and	H.	Taieb	(forthcoming). Fréchette,	G.	and	H.	Taieb	(forthcoming),	"Anton	Marty:	From	Mind	to	Language",	in	Fréchette	and	Taieb (eds),	Mind	and	Language.	The	Philosophy	of	Anton	Marty,	Berlin:	De	Gruyter. Frege,	G.	(1892),	"Über	Sinn	und	Bedeutung"	Zeitschrift	für	Philosophie	und	philosophische	Kritik,	100:	2550. Freudenberger,	T.	(ed.)	(1969)	Die	Universität	Würzburg	und	das	erste	vatikanische	Konzil.	Ein	Beitrag	zur Kirchenund	Geistesgeschichte	des	19.	Jahrhunderts.	Neustadt:	Degener	&	Co. Gadamer,	H.G.	(1985)	„Wilhelm	Dilthey	nach	150	Jahren	(Zwischen	Romantik	und	Positivismus.	Ein Diskussionsbeitrag	)".	Orth	E.W.	(ed)	(1985),	Dilthey	und	die	Philosophie	der	Gegenwart.	Freiburg: Alber:	157-182. Gadamer,	H.-G.	(1987)	Gesammelte	Werke	Band	3:	Hegel,	Husserl,	Heidegger,	Tübingen:	Mohr. 42 Gilson,	L.	(1955),	Méthode	et	métaphysique	selon	Brentano.	Paris:	Vrin. Haller,	R.	(1979)	Studien	zur	österreichischen	Philosophie.	Variationen	über	ein	Thema,	Amsterdam: Rodopi. Haller,	R.	(1993)	Neopositivismus:	eine	historische	Einführung	in	die	Philosophie	des	Wiener	Kreises. Darmstadt:	Wissenschaftliche	Buchgesellschaft. Hertling,	G.	(1919)	Erinnerungen	aus	meinem	Leben,	t.	1,	München,	Verlag	der	Jos.	Kösel'schen Hoppenstedt,	F.	(1933).	Franz	Brentanos	Kantkritik.	Kiel. Husserl,	E.	(1891/2003)	Philosophie	der	Arithmetik.	Halle:	C.E.M.	Pfeffer	(Robert	Stricker).	English translation	(2003),	Philosophy	of	Arithmetic.	Dordrecht:	Springer. Husserl,	E.	(1900/2001a)	Logische	Untersuchungen.	Band	1.	Prolegomena	zur	reinen	Logik.	Halle: Niemeyer.	Quoted	from	the	second	edition	(1913)	English	translation:	Logical	Investigations.	Vol.	1. London:	Routledge. Husserl,	E.	(1901a)	Logische	Untersuchungen,	Vol.	2/2.	Halle:	Niemeyer.	Quoted	from	the	second	edition (1921).	English	translation:	Logical	Investigations.	Vol.	2.	London:	Routledge. Husserl,	E.	(1913/1983),	Ideen	zu	einer	reinen	Phänomenologie	und	phänomenologischen	Philosophie. Halle:	Max	Niemeyer.	English	translation	(1983),	Ideas	Pertaining	to	a	Pure	Phenomenology	and	to	a Phenomenological	Philosophy:	Dordrecht:	Kluwer. Husserl,	E.	(1919/1976),	"Erinnerungen	an	Franz	Brentano"	in	O.	Kraus	(ed),	Franz	Brentano:	Zur Kenntnis	seines	Lebens	und	seiner	Lehre,	Munich:	Beck:	151-167.	English	translation	as "Reminiscences	of	Franz	Brentano"	in	L.	McAlister	(ed.),	The	Philosophy	of	Franz	Brentano,	London: Duckworth:	47-55. Husserl	(1962/1991),	Zur	Phänomenologie	des	inneren	Zeitbewusstseins	(1893-1917).	Den	Haag:	Martinus Nijhoff.	English	translation	(1991):	On	the	Phenomenology	of	the	Consciousness	of	Internal	Time (1893-1917).	Dordrecht:	Kluwer. Husserl,	E.	(1966/1977),	Phänomenologische	Psychologie.	Vorlesungen	1925.	Den	Haag:	Martinus	Nijhoff. English	translation	(1977):	Phenomenological	Psychology.	Lectures,	Summer	Semester	1925.	The Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff. Husserl,	E.	(1979)	Aufsätze	und	Rezensionen	(1890–1910).	The	Hague:	Nijhoff. Husserl,	E.	(1986)	Vorlesungen	über	Bedeutungslehre.	Sommersemester	1908.	The	Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff. Husserl,	E.	(1988)	Vorlesungen	über	Ethik	und	Wertlehre	1908-1914.	Dordrecht:	Kluwer. Husserl,	E.	(1991a/1999),	„Intentionale	Gegenstände",	Brentano	Studien	3:	177-202.	English	translation (1999)	„intentional	Objects",	in	R.	Rollinger	(1999),	Husserl's	Position	in	the	School	of	Brentano. Dordrecht:	Kluwer:	251-284. Husserl,	E.	(1994)	Briefwechsel	Band	I.	Die	Brentanoschule.	Dordrecht:	Kluwer. Husserl,	E.	(2002)	Logische	Untersuchungen.	Ergänzungsband.	Erster	Teil.	Entwürfe	zur	Umarbeitung	der VI.	Untersuchung	und	zur	Vorrede	für	die	Neuauflage	der	Logischen	Untersuchungen	(Sommer	1913). Dordrecht:	Springer. Ingarden,	R.	(1969).	"Le	concept	de	philosophie	chez	Franz	Brentano",	Archives	de	philosophie,	vol.	32, 458-465;	609-638. Kraus,	O.	(ed)	(1919),	Franz	Brentano:	Zur	Kenntnis	seines	Lebens	und	seiner	Lehre,	Munich:	Beck. Kraus,	O.	(1937)	Die	Werttheorien.	Brünn:	Rohrer. Kraus,	O	(1931),	„Über	Alles	und	Nichts",	Philosophische	Hefte,	vol.	2. Kriegel,	U.	(forthcoming),	Brentano's	Philosophical	System.	Mind,	Being,	Value,	Oxford:	Oxford	University Press. Lasaulx,	E.	(1856)	Neuer	Versuch	einer	alten	auf	die	Wahrheit	der	Thatsachen	gegründeten	Philosophie der	Geschichte.	Literarisch-Artistische	Anstalt	der	J.	G.	Cotta'schen	Buchhandlung,	Munich. MacIntyre,	R.	and	D.W.	Smith	(1982),	Husserl	and	Intentionality:	A	Study	of	Mind,	Meaning	and	Language. Dordrecht:	Reidel Meinong,	A.	(1899/1978),	"Über	Gegenstände	höherer	Ordnung	und	deren	Verhältnis	zur	inneren Wahrnehmung",	Zeitschrift	für	Psychologie	und	Physiologie	der	Sinnesorgane,	21:	182-272.	English Translation	(1978)	„On	Objects	of	Higher	Order	and	Their	Relationship	to	Internal	Perception",	in M.-L.	Schubert	Kalsi	(ed),	Alexius	Meinong	On	Objects	of	Higher	Order	and	Husserl's	Phenomenology: The	Hague:	Nijhoff:	137-208. Mill,	J.	St.	(1868)	Auguste	Comte	et	le	positivisme.	Paris:	Baillière. Münch,	D.	(2004),	"Neues	zum	frühen	Brentano".	Grazer	Philosophische	Studien	67:	209-225. Mulligan	(1986),	"Exactness,	Description	and	Variation:	How	Austrian	Analytic	Philosophy	Was	Done",	in Nyíri,	J.C.	(ed.),	Von	Bolzano	zu	Wittgenstein.	The	Tradition	of	Austrian	Philosophy.	Vienna:	HölderPichler-Tempsky:	86-97. 43 Mulligan,	K.	(1989)	"The	Expression	of	Exactness:	Ernst	Mach,	the	Brentanists	and	the	Ideal	of	Clarity",	in (ed.)	Robert	Pynsent,	Decadence	and	Innovation.	Austro-Hungarian	Life	and	Art	at	the	Turn	of	the Century.	London:	Weidenfeld	&	Nicolson:	33–42. Mulligan,	K.	(1990),	"Genauigkeit	und	Geschwätz-Glossen	zu	einem	paradigmatischen	Gegensatz	in	der Philosophie"	in	Hgb.	H.	Bachmaier	Wien-Paradigmen	der	Moderne,	Amsterdam:	Benjamins,	209– 236. Mulligan,	K.	(1997)	"Sur	l'Histoire	de	l'approche	analytique	de	l'histoire	de	la	philosophie:	de	Bolzano	et Brentano	à	Bennett	et	Barnes",	(Ed.)	J.-M.	Vienne,	Philosophie	analytique	et	Histoire	de	la philosophie,	Paris:	Vrin,	61–103. Mulligan,	K.	(2001)	"De	la	philosophie	autrichienne	et	de	sa	place",	J.-P.	Cometti	&	K.	Mulligan	eds.,	La Philosophie	autrichienne	de	Bolzano	à	Musil.	Histoire	et	Actualité,	Paris:	Vrin,	8–25. Mulligan,	K.	(2012)	Wittgenstein	et	la	philosophie	austro-allemande,	Paris:	Vrin. Mulligan,	K.	(forthcoming)	"Incorrect	Emotions	in	Ancient,	Austrian	&	Contemporary	Philosophy",	Revue Philosophique	de	la	France	et	de	l'Étranger. Mulligan,	K.	(forthcoming-b)	"Logical	Norms,	Logical	Truths	&	(Normative)	Grounding",	in	S.	Roski	and	B. Schnieder	(eds),	Bolzano	and	Grounding,	Oxford,	Oxford	University	Press. Oberkofler,	G.	(ed)	(1989).	Franz	Brentano.	Briefe	an	Carl	Stumpf	1867–1917,	Graz:	Akademische	Druckund Verlaganstalt. Ogden,	C.	K.	and	Richards,	I.	A.	(1923),	The	Meaning	of	Meaning,	London,	Kegan	Paul,	Trench,	Trubner. Owen,	G.E.L. (1960), "Logic	and	Mataphysics in	Some	Earlier	Works	of	Aristotle", in I.	During	and	G.E.L. Owen	(eds),	Aristotle	and	Plato	in	the	Mid-Fourth	Century.	Goteborg:	163-190. Rabinowicz,	W.	&	Rønnow-Rasmussen,	T.	2004	'The	Strike	of	the	Demon:	On	Fitting	Pro-attitudes	and Value,'	Ethics,	114,	391-424. Rollinger,	R.	(2012),	„Brentano's	Psychology	from	an	empirical	Standpoint:	Its	background	and conception",	in	I.	Tănăsescu	(ed.)	Franz	Brentano's	Metaphysics	and	Psychology,	Bucharest:	Zeta Books. Ryle,	G.	(1929),	„Heidegger's	‚Sein	und	Zeit",	Mind,	vol.	38:	355-370. Ryle,	G.	(1976),	„Disgusted	Grandfather	of	Phenomenology"	Times	Higher	Education	Supplement, September	10:	15. Sauer,	W.	(2000),	"Erneuerung	der	Philosophia	Perennis",	Grazer	Philosophische	Studien,	vol.	58:	119-149. Scanlon,	T.M.	(1998),	What	We	Owe	to	Each	Other,	Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press. Schelling, F. (1802) "Fernere Darstellungen aus dem System der Philosophie", in Neue Zeitschrift für speculative	Physik,	1.	Band	(1802),	S.	1–77(reprinted	in	Schelling	(1859)). Schelling,	F.	(1859),	Sämtliche	Werke,	Erste	Abteilung,	Vierter	Band,	Stuttgart,	Cotta. Schnabel,	F.	(1937),	Deutsche	Geschichte	im	19.	Jahrhundert.	Band	4:	Die	religiösen	Kräfte.	Freiburg: Herder. Schoeps,	H.-J.	(1953).	Vorläufer	Spenglers:	Studien	zum	Geschichtspessimismus	im	19.	Jahrhundert.	Leiden: Brill. Schödler,	F.	(1852),	Das	Buch	der	Natur,	die	Lehren	der	Physik,	Astronomie,	Chemie,	Mineralogie,	Geologie, Physiologie,	Botanik	und	Zoologie	umfassend,	6th	edition,	Braunschweig,	Vieweg	&	Sohn. Shields	(1999),	Order	in	Multiplicity.	Homonymy	in	the	Philosophy	of	Aristotle.	Oxford:	Clarendon	Press. Simons,	P.	(1986)	"The	Anglo-Austrian	Analytic	Axis", in	J.C.	Nyíri	(ed.)	Von	Bolzano	zu	Wittgenstein.	Zur Tradition	der	österreichischen	Philosophie.	Vienna:	Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky:	98-107. Simons,	P.	(2000)	"The	Four	Phases	of	Philosophy:	Brentano's	Theory	and	Austria's	History".	The	Monist 83:	68-88. Smith,	B.	(1981)	"The	production	of	ideas:	Notes	on	Austrian	Intellectual	History	from	Bolzano	to Wittgenstein,	in	B.	Smith	(ed.)	Structure	and	Gestalt:	Philosophy	and	Literature	in	Austria-Hungary and	her	Successor	States.	Amsterdam:	Benjamins:	211-234. Smith,	B.	(1987)	"The	Substance	of	Brentano's	Ontology",	Topoi	6/1:	39-49. Smith,	B.	(1989)	"On	the	origins	of	analytic	philosophy".	Grazer	philosophische	Studien	35:	153-173. Smith,	B.	(1994)	Austrian	Philosophy.	The	Legacy	of	Franz	Brentano.	Chicago:	Open	Court. Smith,	B.	(1996)	"The	Neurath-Haller	Thesis:	Austria	and	the	Rise	of	Scientific	Philosophy,	in	K.	Lehrer	and J.	Marek	(eds.),	Austrian	Philosophy	Past	and	Present,	Dordrecht,	Kluwer,	p.	1-20. Spiegelberg,	H.	(1981)	The	Context	of	the	Phenomenological	Movement.	Dordrecht:	Springer. Spiegelberg,	H.	(1982)	The	Phenomenological	Movement.	A	Historical	Introduction,	3.	ed,	Den	Haag, Martinus	Nijhoff. Spiegelberg,	H.	(1971)	"From	Husserl	to	Heidegger.	Excerpts	From	a	1928	Freiburg	Diary	by	W.	R.	Boyce Gibson",	in	The	Journal	of	the	British	Society	for	Phenomenology	1	:	58–83. 44 Stern,	W.	(1897/2005)	"Psychische	Präsenzzeit".	Zeitschrift	für	Psychologie	und	Physiologie	der Sinnesorgane	13:325-359.	English	translation	(2005)	„Mental	Presence-Time",	The	New	Yearbook for	Phenomenology	and	Phenomenological	Philosophy	5:	311-351. Stöckl,	A.	(1870),	Lehrbuch	der	Geschichte	der	Philosophie,	Mainz:	Kirchheim. Stölzle,	R.	(1904),	Ernst	von	Lasaulx	(1805-61),	ein	Lebensbild,	Münster,	Aschendoffsche	Buchhandlung. Stumpf,	C.	(1907)	Erscheinungen	und	psychische	Funktionen.	Berlin:	Reimer. Stumpf,	C.	(1908)	Die	Wiedergeburt	der	Philosophie.	Leipzig:	Barth. Stumpf,	C.	(1919/1976)	"Erinnerungen	an	Franz	Brentano",	in	O.	Kraus	(ed),	Franz	Brentano:	Zur	Kenntnis seines	Lebens	und	seiner	Lehre,	Munich:	Beck:	87-149.	English	translation:	"Reminiscences	of	Franz Brentano",	in	L.	McAlister	(ed.),	The	Philosophy	of	Franz	Brentano,	London:	Duckworth,	pp.	10-46. Stumpf,	C.	(1922),	«	Franz	Brentano,	Professor	der	Philosophie,	1838-1917	»	Chroust	A.	(ed.),	Lebensläufe aus	Franken,	vol.	2,	Würzburg:	Kabbitzsch	&	Mönnich:	67-85. Stumpf,	C.	(1924/1930)	„Selbstdarstellung"	in	R.	Schmidt	(ed.),	Die	Philosophie	der	Gegenwart	in Selbstdarstellungen	Vol.	5.	Leipzig:	Meiner:	205-265.	English	translation	in	(1930),	„Autobiography of	Carl	Stumpf",	in	Murchison,	C.	(ed.),	History	of	Psychology	in	Autobiography	Vol.	1,	Worcester: Clark	University	Press:	389-441. Thiele,	J.	(ed)	1978,	Wissenschaftliche	Kommunikation.	Die	Korrespondenz	Ernst	Mach,	Kastellaun:	Henn. Thomson,	W. (1855), "On	Mechanical Antecedents of	Motion,	Heat, and Light" in	Report	of the	TwentyFourth	Meeting	of	the	British	Association	for	the	Advancement	of	Science,	London:	John	Murray:	59– 62. Twardowski,	K.	(1894/1977)	Zur	Lehre	vom	Inhalt	und	Gegenstand	der	Vorstellungen.	Eine	psychologische Untersuchung.	Vienna:	Hölder.	English	translation	(1977)	On	the	Content	and	Object	of Presentations.	A	Psychological	Investigation.	The	Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff. Twardowski	(1996[1914]/1999a),	"Funktionen	und	Gebilde"	Conceptus	29	(75),	157-196.	English translation	in	(1999a),	„On	actions	and	products",	in	K.	Twardowski,	On	Actions,	Products	and	Other Topics	in	Philosophy,	Amsterdam:	Rodopi:	103-132. Twardowski,	K.	(1991/1999),	"Selbstdarstellung",	Grazer	Philosophische	Studien,	vol.	39,	no.	1:	1-26. English	translation	in	(1999),	"Self-Portrait",	Twardowski,	K.,	On	Actions,	Products	and	Other	Topics in	Philosophy,	Amsterdam:	Rodopi:	41-64. Utitz,	E.	(1954)	«	Erinnerungen	an	Franz	Brentano	»,	Wissenschaftliche	Zeitschrift	der	MartinLuther Universität	Halle-Wittenberg,	vol.	4,	n°	1,	1954,	p.	73-90. Von	Mises,	R. (1939/1951).	Kleines	Lehrbuch	des	Positivismus. Den	Haag: Stockhum. English translation (1951):	Positivism:	A	Study	in	Human	Understanding.	Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press. Werle,	J.	(1989).	Franz	Brentano	und	die	Zukunft	der	Philosophie.	Amsterdam:	Rodopi. Whewell, W. (1847) The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded upon their History, Volume 1. London:	Parker. Archive	Materials Brentano,	F.	(frühe	Schriften):	Frühe	Schriften.	Houghton	Library,	Harvard	University. Brentano,	F.	EL72:	Logikkolleg	1878/79.	Houghton	Library,	Harvard	University. Brentano,	F.	EL75:	Zur	Logik.	Altes	Logikkolleg	vor	1874.	Houghton	Library,	Harvard	University.) Brentano,	F.	EL80:	Logik	(s.d)	Houghton	Library,	Harvard	University. Brentano,	F.	EL81:	Fragmente	(1875)	Houghton	Library,	Harvard	University. Brentano,	F.	PS48:	Zur	Psychognosie.	Vorarbeiten.	Houghton	Library,	Harvard	University. Brentano,	F.	(1867b)	Metaphysik.	Vorlesung	1867.	Houghton	Library,	Harvard	University. Brentano,	F.	(1873),	Brief	an	Marty,	31.	März	1873.	Houghton	Library,	Harvard. Brentano,	F.	(1886),	Brief	an	Marty,	8.	April	1886.	Houghton	Library,	Harvard. Brentano,	F.	(1886),	Brief	an	Marty,	22.	Oktober	1886.	Houghton	Library,	Harvard. Masaryk,	T.	(1877/78)	Brentanos	Vorlesungen	zur	Metaphysik.	Masaryk	Archives,	Prague. Stumpf,	C.	(1930),	Brief	an	Köhler,	1.	April	1930.	Archives	of	the	American	Philosophical	Society, Philadelphia.